This paper investigates the relationship between investor protection and CEO pay in family-controlled corporations. The sensitivity of pay to the institutional context is higher for family-CEO than professional- CEO, a result that corroborates the hypothesis that CEO compensation contracts in family firms are influenced by familiar connections. These results are more consistent with the hypothesis of rent extraction than with the perspective of optimal remuneration contracts.
INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CEO COMPENSATION IN FAMILY FIRMS
BARONTINI, Roberto;MIROSHNYCHENKO, IVAN
2017-01-01
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between investor protection and CEO pay in family-controlled corporations. The sensitivity of pay to the institutional context is higher for family-CEO than professional- CEO, a result that corroborates the hypothesis that CEO compensation contracts in family firms are influenced by familiar connections. These results are more consistent with the hypothesis of rent extraction than with the perspective of optimal remuneration contracts.File in questo prodotto:
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