

# Fault Tolerance in Real-Time Cloud Computing

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**Abstract**—This paper presents the **Fault-Tolerant Real-Time Cloud (FTRTC) project** that aims to design cloud computing infrastructures capable of hosting highly reliable and real-time applications. These applications are characterized by strict timing and reliability constraints, as well as critical failure scenarios. For instance, such requirements are commonly found in the context of Industry 4.0. We present a formalization of the problem of designing real-time cloud applications supporting an adjustable level of fault tolerance throughout their distributed execution in a cloud infrastructure. The contributions presented in this paper indicate important research directions when building cloud infrastructures able to supporting ultra-reliable real-time applications.

**Index Terms**—Cloud Computing, Real-Time Computing, Fault Tolerance

## I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing has become an increasingly pervasive technology, and it has transformed a large part of the IT industry, as foreseen in the seminal paper by Armbrust and others [5]. Today, cloud technologies are mature enough to handle applications with precise performance requirements, but the evolution of hardware, software, and networks is making cloud computing appealing also for a new class of real-time workloads [9], [15], [25]. Specifically, applications characterized by strict timing and reliability constraints that must be respected under a multitude of conditions and failure scenarios cannot be deployed in contemporary cloud infrastructures [17]. These include a number of computing scenarios that are becoming increasingly interesting, for example, in the context of Industry 4.0, with cloud/edge-assisted operation of robots in automated factories, or for deploying complex AI-based features needed to augment the real-time control capabilities of future autonomous vehicles.

Traditional time-critical applications generally run on bare hardware and are designed as a set of periodic or sporadic sequential real-time tasks [7], [12], [23]. It is relatively simple to schedule such a straightforward task model and provide appropriate guarantees in regard to task performance requirements, even in the presence of interactions among tasks due to locking [27]. More complex task models can also be considered, like, for example, parallel tasks [10], [20], [26].

However, cloud-native applications [8] are characterized by a quite more complex and often distributed architecture. Differently from traditional monolithic applications, cloud-native ones are often composed of a number of different services

or microservices [21] that may be deployed on the same or different machines. Hence, the first step in designing an infrastructure providing performance guarantees to cloud-native real-time applications is to build an accurate performance model for distributed applications composed of a number of components, which we refer to as *microservices* from here onwards. Since microservices are generally distributed over multiple machines, possibly spread over different availability zones, the failure of a single machine does not completely compromise the functionality of a microservice that remains available with a degraded performance level until the fault is fixed. In particular, the architecture is designed and provisioned so that some failures can be tolerated without affecting the application's operation. For real-time applications, this means that the system can be designed and dimensioned so that a controlled number of failures do not result in missed deadlines. Of course, this requires designing the microservice architecture appropriately so that it is possible to both analyze and control its temporal behavior.

This paper introduces the Fault-Tolerant Real-Time Cloud (FTRTC) project, aiming at providing an adjustable level of fault tolerance in a cloud environment designed to support real-time applications. The main challenges in implementing fault tolerance in cloud-native real-time applications are identified, alongside the most important building blocks that can be leveraged, to build a software solution suitable for FTRTC.

## II. PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS

To properly design solutions able to meet the need of FTRTC, it is important to formally define the problem it addresses, which is serving and scheduling multiple cloud-native applications with a desired degree of fault tolerance. This section provides some important definitions. From a practical standpoint, the project will provide implementations based on the popular Kubernetes framework.

1) *Application Model*: A FTRTC platform hosts a set of cloud-native applications, built by users as composition of independent, loosely coupled tasks. Such distributed applications can be represented in the form of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) topologies. More formally, a FTRTC platform hosts a set of  $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{A}^g\}_{g=1}^{n_A}$  cloud-native applications, where  $\mathcal{A}^g$  is a tuple  $(\Gamma^g, \mathcal{E}^g, P^g, D^g)$ . The DAG topology is specified by a subset of tasks  $\Gamma^g \subseteq \Gamma$  and by a set of directed edges  $\mathcal{E}^g \subseteq \Gamma^g \times \Gamma^g$ . A task  $\tau_i^g \in \Gamma^g$  represents a sequential activity that receives some data in input, processes it, and




Fig. 1. Parallel real-time application modeled as a DAG of multiple tasks (the  $g$  have been removed to simplify the figure).

then generates some output. Each task  $\tau_i^g$  is characterized by a Worst Case Execution Time (WCET), the maximum time for which a task needs to execute to generate an output after receiving a request.

Task-to-task communications in application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  are represented by directed edges  $(\tau_i^g, \tau_j^g) \in \mathcal{E}^g$ , meaning that  $\tau_i^g$  sends a message to  $\tau_j^g$  at the end of its computations. More specifically,  $\tau_i^g$  is said to be a *predecessor* of task  $\tau_j^g$ , and  $\tau_j^g$  is said to be a *successor* of  $\tau_i^g$ . Therefore, for each activation of application  $\mathcal{A}^g$ ,  $\tau_j^g$  can be executed only after  $\tau_i^g$  is terminated. Note that, since  $\mathcal{A}^g$  is an acyclic graph, the transitive closure of  $\mathcal{E}^g$  must be a partial order relation. Each task can have any number of predecessors and any number of successors (0, 1, or more). According to these precedence constraints, multiple tasks may be executed in parallel. For each application  $\mathcal{A}^g$ , there is exactly one task  $\tau_0^g$  with no predecessors, called *input task*, and another task  $\tau_e^g$  with no successors, called *exit task*. Finally, we assume each DAG to be completely connected, therefore for each node  $\tau_i^g \in \Gamma^g$  exists a directed sequence of tasks (i.e. a path) from  $\tau_0^g$  to  $\tau_e^g$  which includes  $\tau_i^g$ . Figure 1 shows an example of an application modeled as a DAG. Each application is activated when some data is available for processing at the input task  $\tau_0^g$ . After the exit task  $\tau_e^g$  finishes processing its input data, the application activation is concluded. Given a generic task  $\tau_i^g$ , it becomes ready for execution after receiving data from all its predecessors  $\{\tau_h^g \mid (\tau_h^g, \tau_i^g) \in \mathcal{E}^g\}$ . Task  $\tau_i^g$  then processes its input data and generate some output to be sent to all its successor tasks  $\{\tau_j^g \mid (\tau_i^g, \tau_j^g) \in \mathcal{E}^g\}$ . Similarly, each  $\tau_j^g$  becomes ready for execution after receiving data from all its predecessors.

Real-time applications can be *periodic* or *sporadic*, depending on their activation patterns. An application is periodic if the time interval between two consecutive activations is constant and equal to the application period  $P^g$ , and is sporadic if the time interval between two consecutive activations is larger or equal than a minimum inter-arrival time  $P^g$ . Since the input task  $\tau_0^g$  is the first task of the DAG, when it receives a request (and hence becomes ready for execution) the application is activated. For example, in the case of a periodic application, task  $\tau_0^g$  receives its  $k^{th}$  request for execution at time  $t_k^g = t_0^g + k \cdot P^g$ , where  $t_0^g$  corresponds to the time of the first activation of the application. A real-time application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  is also characterized by an end-to-end deadline  $D^g$ , so that if the application is activated (i.e., its input task  $\tau_0^g$  receives a request and becomes ready for execution) at time  $t_k^g = t_0^g + k \cdot P^g$ , then




Fig. 2. Structure of a microservice  $S$  composed of  $m$  containers serving tasks  $\tau_i^1$  and  $\tau_j^2$  from two different applications,  $\mathcal{A}^1$  and  $\mathcal{A}^2$ . Note that they are application-specific instances of the same functionality.

the application must finish (i.e. its output task  $\tau_e^g$  must generate an output) before time  $d_k^g = t_k^g + D^g = t_0^g + k \cdot P^g + D^g$ .

2) *Cloud Model*: The big difference between traditional real-time applications and the cloud-native real-time applications is that while the former are composed of tasks (threads or processes) that are statically deployed on physical machines using a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS), a task  $\tau_i^g \in \Gamma^g$  of a cloud-native application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  is executed by a *microservice*  $S_l$ . In a cloud scenario, the individual  $\tau_i^g$  may be shared among multiple applications, therefore a set  $\phi = \{\varphi_g\}_{g=1}^{n_A}$  of DAG-to-microservice mapping functions  $\varphi_g: \{0, \dots, e\} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, n_S\}$  is required to distinguish between the  $\{\Gamma^g\}$  that may partially overlap. For instance, a task  $\tau_i^g \in \Gamma^g$  is the  $i^{th}$  activity of application  $\mathcal{A}^g$ , and it is implemented by microservice  $S_l$ , where  $\varphi_g(i) = l$ . Every microservice  $S_l$  is formed by  $m_l$  containers and a load balancer distributing the input data to one of them. For example, Figure 2 shows a microservice  $S$  (the subscript  $l$  has been removed to simplify the figure) serving two tasks  $\tau_i^1$  and  $\tau_j^2$ , where  $\varphi_1(i) = \varphi_2(j) = l$ . This means that the two tasks perform the same activity, but are part of two different applications,  $\mathcal{A}^1$  and  $\mathcal{A}^2$ . When executing a task  $\tau_i^g$ , a container of  $S_l$  takes at most a WCET  $c_l$ . Notice that the WCET characterizes a microservice  $S_l$ , therefore it is not application-dependent and can be associated with all the tasks executed by  $S_l$ . The various containers implementing a microservice  $S_l$  generally run on different machines, so that if one of them crashes or gets disconnected from the network, the containers running on different machines are still active and working. In this work, all the containers implementing  $S_l$  are assumed to be identical, so that  $c_l$  does not depend on the specific container that has been selected by the load balancer. Notice that this assumption applies to the amount of execution time needed by a container to serve a request, not to the real time after which the response is generated. Containers can suffer from interferences due to the other load running on the same machine, and can thus generate a response after different amounts of time —  $c_l$  only indicates the amount of time for which the container executes on a CPU core, without considering preemptions from the host OS or other containers running on the same CPU core, if any.

Figure 3 shows a cloud-native application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  modeled as a DAG with its tasks served by microservices. A single  $S_l$ , which is composed of a load balancer and  $m_l$  containers




Fig. 3. Cloud-native real-time application composed of multiple parallel tasks executing on microservices (the  $g$  have been removed to simplify the figure).

can execute tasks coming from different applications. In other words, microservices can be shared among multiple DAGs. Hence, they can simultaneously receive requests from different applications; as a result, the service of some request  $\tau_i^g$  of an application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  can be delayed by a queuing delay due to requests from other applications. Such delay can be estimated based on the maximum number of tasks concurrently submitting requests, the load balancing discipline and the model-of-computation of the containerized software.

3) *Fault Model*: The containers implementing a microservice can fail due to a number of reasons related to hardware or software problems (for example, the machine on which a container can crash or can be disconnected from the network, or the application running inside the container can crash). The goal of the fault-tolerance mechanism required in our envisioned FTRTC design is to ensure that even if one of the  $m_l$  containers implementing microservice  $S_l$  is down, all the applications using  $S_l$  get their requests serviced within the desired end-to-end deadlines. An easy way to accomplish this goal would be that when a task  $\tau_i^g$  needs to be executed, two parallel instances of the task are actually started, on containers on different servers. However, such an approach would require to double the resource usage of all cloud-native applications, which is considered an excessively high price to pay, considering the negligible likelihood of the event that all said containers can be down at the same time.

In FTRTC, we aim at tolerating *transient* faults: if a container fails, at time  $t$ , it can be able to successfully serve some tasks' requests in the future (either immediately or after a maximum recovery time  $\delta$ ). Hence, when a failed container is detected, a new container is not immediately started to preserve the capacity as long as the service has containers to uphold the deadline guarantees. During such a period, the robustness to further failures is limited.

### III. FAULT DETECTION AND TOLERANCE

FTRTC needs to support the cloud-native parallel application model described in Section II, providing fault tolerance for real-time applications. In this system, the application's tasks are executed on microservices/functions composed of a load balancer and multiple containers, as is common for cloud deployments. The presence of multiple (appropriately dimensioned) containers and the possibility to distribute task executions to these containers is used to tolerate failures.




Fig. 4. Low-latency fault detection employed by FTRTC:  $\tau_2$  misses its partial deadline  $D_2$ , hence it is marked as faulty (the  $g$  have been removed to simplify the figure).

1) *Fault Detection*: It is important to identify a tight upper bound to the time between a fault happening and the cloud platform detecting it (the so-called detection latency) in order to provide fault tolerance for a real-time application characterized by temporal constraints. Cloud instances are often monitored for failures based on periodic health-checks (e.g., ping) to detect failures. This results in a minimum detection latency when no traffic is exchanged, often in the range of one or a few seconds [1], [2], before marking an instance unhealthy. When a connection to a server suddenly drops while serving traffic, load balancers can usually react by tolerating a maximum number of these faults, then they can readily mark the instance unhealthy. Additionally, a potentially lower latency fault detection mechanism may use a request timeout implemented by the requester application or using a service mesh [28].

These mechanisms may be inadequate to support typical FTRTC use-cases, where it is essential, for example, to consider faulty also a container that is not managing to deliver a response by the foreseen WCET  $c_l$ , or a maximum *partial deadline* elapsed. An offline analysis may be used to compute partial deadlines within which all real-time tasks  $\tau_i^g$  should finish. If a task does not complete within its partial deadline, the cloud platform can assume that its underlying container failed. Figure 4 ( $g$  has been removed to simplify the figure) depicts an example of early fault detection applying this mechanism to the application of Figure 1. Each task  $\tau_i$  is assigned a partial deadline  $D_i$ , and  $\tau_2$  misses its deadline. After a time  $D_2$  from the DAG activation, it is possible to detect a failure of the container serving  $\tau_2$ . A second fault detection mechanism considers that a container is supposed to serve a task executing for at most a WCET  $c_l$ . Therefore, the FTRTC platform has a second chance of temporal fault detection, by monitoring the container's task execution and assuming that it failed when no output is produced after executing for  $c_l$ . Such monitoring can be implemented by detecting overruns in the container schedule, and is then local to a host. These two fault detection mechanisms can be combined to improve the system resilience: monitoring  $c_l$  allows detecting applications' misbehavior, whereas monitoring the tasks' partial deadlines allows detecting faults in the containers (or any issue due to unexpected interference from other containers).

2) *Reacting to Faults*: The easiest way to tolerate task execution failures consists of starting two copies of each task (executing in parallel in two containers hosted by different




Fig. 5. Example of task re-execution:  $\tau_2$  re-executes after being marked as faulty (the  $g$  have been removed to simplify the figure).

physical machines) so that when one copy fails, the other one can still provide the correct result in time. This technique, however, consumes CPU time even when there are no failures (which is the most common situation). Therefore, replication should be used only when strictly needed to avoid wasting computational resources. As an alternative, it is possible to start a second copy of a task only when the task is not able to deliver its results in time, assuming the problem is that the container executing the task has failed or that it is delayed beyond what is accounted for. Of course, this is a good idea only when re-executing the task would not anyway lead to a deadline miss. That is, when there is enough time left before the deadline and one of the non-failed microservice's containers has enough spare time to re-execute the task.

Hence, it is crucial to analyze the tasks' schedulability and to understand, for each task, if there is enough time to re-execute a task when a failure is detected. Then, it is possible to resort to starting two parallel copies of a task only when the analysis shows that the two copies are really needed. When possible, containers' failures should be handled by retrying the execution of the served task to a different container on a different host<sup>1</sup>. As a simple example, Figure 5 shows that it is possible to tolerate a fault of task  $\tau_2$  (in Figure 4) without missing the partial deadline of task  $\tau_3$  by re-executing  $\tau_2$  on a different container (and hence respecting the DAG's deadline). If the makespan of the application's DAG execution without faults is smaller than the application's deadline  $D^g$ , then the containers have some spare time that can be used to avoid end-to-end deadline misses when a container fails. When trying to re-execute a failed task<sup>2</sup>  $\tau_i^g$  on a different container, two different situations are possible:

- 1) The microservice  $S_l$  has a dedicated backup container which has enough spare time to re-execute  $\tau_i^g$ .
- 2) The microservice  $S_l$  is composed of multiple containers, and at least one of them is not failed and has enough spare time to re-execute  $\tau_i^g$ .
- 3) If none of the available containers of microservice  $S_l$  has enough spare time to re-execute the failed task, a new container has to be initialized.

Therefore, the cost of re-executing  $\tau_i^g$  depends on how the failure is handled and on some additional assumptions; in

<sup>1</sup>Here, "when possible" means "when it is possible to re-execute the task on a different container *without missing the application's deadline*".

<sup>2</sup>In this context, "failed task" means "tasks which was executed on a failed container".

general, the WCET for the re-execution of the task is considered to be longer than a first execution. In the first case above, re-executing the task incurs a smaller overhead, which can be almost negligible under the assumption of keeping a dedicated backup container to be used for re-executions. In the second case, one of the  $m_l - 1$  remaining containers is used for the re-execution, so the number of requests which can be found in the queue by the re-execution needs to be increased accordingly. For the third case, instead, a new container is needed, the additional time needed to boot and initialize a new container instance (often known as *start-up latency*) must be considered. Such start-up latency can be substantial compared to application deadlines; in those cases, this alternative is not usable.

Summing up, an offline analysis (performed when the system is designed or when a new application is accepted) is used to decide which tasks are statically replicated (tasks for which two concurrent instances are started when the task is activated). Then, when the failure of a container executing a non-replicated task is detected at runtime, the system can check if such tasks can be re-executed on a different container without missing the application's deadline. If such a re-execution causes a deadline miss, the application's activation should be dropped (avoiding to waste computation time with other tasks of the application if there is no possibility of finishing in time). If an application is activated while some containers are failed or are unavailable, and it is not possible to guarantee the respect of its deadline, then the activation can be immediately dropped without starting any of the tasks. So, it is only when the number of containers has decreased sufficiently below  $m_l$  that not even a fault-free execution can be performed that the task is dropped. During this time interval, the service  $S_l$  is executed with higher risk.

3) *Tasks Partial Deadlines and Critical Tasks*: To avoid the long fault-detection latencies introduced by "traditional" ping-based mechanisms, failures can be detected by monitoring the amount of execution time consumed by a container when serving a task, or the container's response time. In the second case, a failing node can be detected in a much shorter time by assigning partial deadlines to tasks and monitoring communications. In practice, if a task  $\tau_i^g$  does not send data to its successor tasks  $\{\tau_j^g \mid (\tau_i^g, \tau_j^g) \in \mathcal{E}^g\}$  before its partial deadline, then the container executing  $\tau_i^g$  is considered to be failed. If application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  is activated at time  $t_k^g$  (and must finish before time  $d_k^g = t_k^g + D^g$ ), its end-to-end deadline  $D^g$  is split into partial deadlines  $D_i^g$  associated to the various tasks  $\tau_i^g$ . Note that the partial deadline  $D_e^g$  of the output task  $\tau_e^g$  must be equal to  $D^g$ . If task  $\tau_i^g$  is "activated in time" (i.e.  $\tau_i^g$  activation time is smaller than  $t_k^g + \max\{D_h^g \mid h : (\tau_h^g, \tau_i^g) \in \mathcal{E}^g\}$ ) but does not finish within time  $d_{k,i}^g = t_k^g + D_i^g$ , then  $\tau_i^g$  execution has failed. As previously mentioned, when analyzing the behavior of an application  $\mathcal{A}^g$ , it is necessary to check if a failed task can be re-executed without causing a deadline miss. This can be done both to provide a runtime check and to provide design-time properties:

- 1) At runtime, when a container's failure is detected, it is

necessary to check if there is time to re-execute the task executed by the failed container without violating the deadline. This check has to be performed considering available containers.

- 2) To ensure the desired fault tolerance properties, at design time, it is necessary to provide guarantees that the system can correctly serve  $\mathcal{A}^g$  within the deadline in the presence of a given maximum number of failures (for example, tolerating a failing task execution per microservice). This must be checked through an offline analysis.

The design problem in item 2 allows for identifying “critical” tasks for which it is not guaranteed in advance that there will be time for re-execution in case of failure. Critical tasks should be statically replicated. Otherwise, a task failure could only be handled by dropping the activation.

#### IV. ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO CONTAINERS

The analysis described at the end of Section III is similar to the schedulability analysis typically performed to analyze and design real-time systems. However, traditional real-time analysis must be modified to account for microservices and containers execution/scheduling. Given an application  $\mathcal{A}^g$ , there are two schedulability questions:

- For which tasks a re-execution on a different container would result in a missed deadline, if their serving container fails?
- In which conditions a task can be re-executed without missing a deadline, if its serving container fails?

While the answer to the first question does not depend on how the containers are scheduled, to answer the second question it is necessary to know how resources are allocated to the various containers. In particular, the containers composing a microservice can execute on dedicated CPU cores (so that a container does not suffer preemptions by other containers) or can share the CPU with other containers (in this case, a CPU scheduler decides which containers are executed at a given time, and should use an appropriate scheduling algorithm to limit the interferences between containers). In any case, microservices are shared by multiple applications; hence, the temporal behavior of an application  $\mathcal{A}^g$  also depends on the other applications using the same microservices. This fact can be accounted for in the analysis without having to consider all the details of every application running in the cloud, but only  $\mathcal{A}^g$ . It can be done by inflating the execution time  $c_l$  of each task  $\tau_i^g$  to take into account the queue delay, defined as  $C_l$ , and the corresponding re-execution time  $C'_l$ .

Based on this, it is possible to check when there surely is no time to re-execute a task, independently on how the containers are scheduled or how resources are allocated to them. In particular, the function  $\text{critical}(\tau, t)$  returns `true` if task  $\tau$  cannot be re-executed in case of failure at time  $t$ , and returns `false` otherwise. By considering the latest possible time when a failure of task  $\tau_i^g$  can be detected, it is possible to identify *critical* tasks, which are tasks for which

it is not guaranteed that there is time for re-execution in case of failure. For example, assume that container is considered to have failed if it tries to execute for longer than its WCET. In this case,  $\text{critical}(\tau_i^g, t)$  is `true` if  $C_l + C'_l > D_i^g$ . If all containers are statically assigned their CPU cores (and are hence not scheduled), then a non-critical task is guaranteed to always have time for being re-executed as soon as there is at most one failed container per microservice.

If, instead, containers are not assigned whole CPU cores but are scheduled, then to guarantee that the re-execution of a task does not result in a missed deadline, it is necessary to use an appropriate container scheduling algorithm. FTRTC considers two possible scheduling strategies: one based on the *Hierarchical Constant Bandwidth Server* (HCBS) [3], [11] and one based on fixed priorities. The HCBS is a reservation-based scheduling algorithm that has the advantage of supporting the Compositional Scheduling Framework [13], [29]. Hence, it allows re-using a lot of results from real-time literature (which investigated at length hierarchical scheduling based on resource reservations). An implementation in the Linux kernel (based on a modification of the `SCHED_DEADLINE` policy [22]) is already available, and some prototype patches are available to support it in Kubernetes [16]. For applications needing very low latencies, such as a cloud Radio Access Network (cRAN) [4], it might make sense to schedule the containers according to fixed priorities and not use CPU reservations. In this case, the schedulability of an application can be checked without assigning partial deadlines to tasks but by using a different analysis based on self-suspending tasks [6]. Such analysis can be extended to account for failing containers, replicated tasks, and tasks’ re-execution (when needed).

#### V. RELATED WORK

Fault tolerance in real-time systems has been studied for a long time [18] and has been generally implemented through specialized CPU scheduling algorithms. Later works considered fault tolerance in real-time clouds [24], but did not consider cloud-native applications and the microservices model, which is supported by FTRTC.

Some works support fault tolerance in cloud environments by scheduling backup copies of failed tasks. For example, QAFT [32] schedules primary and backup copies of tasks on different cloud nodes, considering different QoS levels for the tasks and different speeds for the cloud nodes. However, it only considers independent aperiodic real-time tasks (and not parallel applications), and it does not consider a microservice model as FTRTC does. FESTAL [31] also considers sets of independent real-time tasks and implements fault tolerance by scheduling backup copies of failed tasks. Migratable Virtual Machines are used to move primary and backup copies between physical hosts so that faults are tolerated without overallocating resources. EFTR [19] is a similar algorithm that takes energy consumption into account. FTRTC does not use VMs or migrations of tasks between physical hosts because

they introduce overheads and delays that are not compatible with the deadlines to be respected.

Other, more recent, works [14], [30] base the fault tolerance mechanisms on containers, using Kubernetes to manage them and improve the Kubernetes scheduler and fault-detection mechanism to react to failures in a shorter time. However, they do not explicitly consider real-time applications and deadline constraints.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This paper described the design of a fault-tolerant real-time cloud computing platform, starting by identifying the challenges that need to be addressed and the fundamental core requirements to be satisfied by possible mechanisms to be used in said context. The paper introduced formally the problem of fault-tolerant execution of real-time cloud applications, and discussed the difficulties in ensuring predictability in execution of distributed cloud-based applications modeled as DAGs. It also discussed the need for providing low-latency fault detection, e.g., by monitoring the respect of the tasks' partial deadlines, as well as the need for tolerating a controlled number of faults by using microservices composed of multiple containers and by re-executing failed tasks on different containers. As a future work, the presented architecture will be implemented based on Kubernetes, and its properties will be tested through an extensive set of experiments.

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