Energy efficiency policies in an agent-based macroeconomic model[☆]Marco Amendola^{a,*}, Francesco Lamperti^{b,c}, Andrea Roventini^{b,d}, Alessandro Sapio^e^a Department of Industrial and Information Engineering and Economics, L'Aquila University, L'Aquila, Italy^b Institute of Economics and EMbeDS, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy^c RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan, Italy^d OFCE - Sciences Po, Sophia Antipolis, France^e Department of Business and Economics, Parthenope University of Naples, Naples, Italy

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ABSTRACT

Energy efficiency can help facing the climate crises. Yet the energy intensity has decreased more slowly than required to achieve climate goals. Based on this premise, we build an agent-based model to study the effects of different energy efficiency policies. Policies analysed range from indirect policies – taxes, incentives, and subsidies – to direct technological policies, where a public research laboratory invests in R&D to establish a new technological energy efficiency paradigm. Results reveal that, although most of the policies effectively reduce energy intensity, the research lab is the most efficient in promoting energy efficiency without negative impacts on macroeconomic and public finance conditions. However, the success of this policy requires a long-term commitment, highlighting the importance of complementing this strategy with more “ready to use” measures. The findings also indicate that most policies do not induce significant macroeconomic rebound effects. Concerns about macroeconomic rebound effects may likely be overstated.

1. Introduction

Challenges to social, economic, and environmental sustainability have become alarmingly pressing in the most recent years. Soaring energy costs due to war-related and post-Covid supply chain disruptions pose an immediate threat to purchasing powers and business survival in energy-importing countries, especially for low-income households and SMEs (IEA, 2022c; OECD, 2022; KfW, 2022). At the same time, the signs of climate change spark worries in the public opinion, and not just among COP delegates.

Faced with such a combination of threats, urgent action is needed. Longer-term policy responses with varying degrees of environmental friendliness are being discussed, such as reducing the energy intensity of our economies (IEA, 2022b).

Energy intensity, i.e., the ratio between energy used and GDP, has in fact experienced substantial downward trajectories for some decades (see Voigt et al., 2014), only to slow-down in the most recent years at the global level. According to IEA (2022a), the global energy intensity improvement rate dropped to 1.5% in 2019, below the 2.6% annual target that would allow reaching SDG 7.3. The IEA

points the finger against “weaker energy efficiency policy in many major economies”. It is a broadly shared view that significant reductions in the energy intensity will be crucial to contain climate-altering emissions (Peters et al., 2017; Fricko et al., 2017) as well as to face the energy crisis. For instance, according to some analyses, the uncertainty about the future evolution of energy intensity is the most important “Kaya factor” in explaining the uncertainty about future emissions (Marangoni et al., 2017).¹

Generally speaking, reductions in energy intensity can be explained by two main drivers, which can be labelled as: (i) structural effect, (ii) technology effect. The structural effect captures possible shifts away from energy-intensive industries towards less energy-intensive ones. The technology effect captures, instead, within-sector energy efficiency improvements. Several empirical analyses find that the trend observed in the last decades is largely attributable to technological change, while the structural effect is less important in most countries (Geller et al., 2006; Mulder and De Groot, 2012; Voigt et al., 2014). This trend is also confirmed for the most recent years, as it emerges, for example, in reports of the International Energy Agency (e.g. IEA, 2019).

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¹ The Kaya identity expresses emissions as the product of the following Kaya factors: population, GDP per capita, energy intensity, and emission intensity (Kaya, 1989).

Furthermore, most projections predict that the technology effect will keep prevailing in the future, with energy efficiency improvements as the major driver of energy intensity reduction in the next decades (e.g. IEA, 2016).

Yet, the role of energy efficiency in containing climate-altering emissions may be overestimated if the rebound effect is substantial (e.g. Stern, 2017). The magnitude of the rebound effect is controversial, as it involves indirect channels which are rather difficult to estimate (see Saunders, 2013; Turner, 2013).

This given, understanding how policy interventions can foster energy efficiency and affect energy demand over time appears crucial in light of the current societal challenges related to energy security and climate change. Drawing on this premise, the paper builds a macroeconomic agent-based model to study and compare a broad range of energy efficiency policies. Alongside indirect policies based on taxes, incentives, and subsidies (cf. Geller et al., 2006; Tanaka, 2011), rooted in a traditional role of the government as “fixing market failures”, we test “direct technological” policies, wherein the public sector directly invests in R&D to shape technological opportunities (see Freeman, 1987; Dosi and Nelson, 2010). An instance of direct technological policies is given by mission-oriented policies, defined as *systemic public policies that draw on frontier knowledge to attain specific goals* (Mazzucato, 2018). Building upon previous work by Dosi (1988) and Foray et al. (2012) among others, missions are meant to address ‘grand societal challenges’ highlighting the strategic direction that public R&D needs to take, and view the government as “shaping or creating markets” rather than fixing them (Mazzucato, 2016). Energy efficiency has been among the goals of mission-oriented policies implemented by the US Department of Energy (Rodrik, 2014) and by Germany’s public investment bank KfW and Energiewende (Mazzucato, 2018).²

New energy efficient technologies in manufacturing do occasionally assume the features of radical innovation, giving rise to new technological trajectories or even new technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982, 1988). Examples of applications range from heat pumps, to mechanical and thermal vapour recompression; from anaerobic treatment of effluents, to homogenisation valves (see CanmetENERGY, 2020), and the 5G (Ericsson, 2020). Developing radical innovations in the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes is among the goals of public agencies such as ARPA-E in the United States, which pursue advances in high-potential, high-impact energy technologies that are too early for private-sector investment.³

Further motivating our focus on energy efficiency, Dosi et al. (2006, p. 1462) recommended that Europe, in order to bridge the technology gap with the US, should *develop large-scale, technologically daring missions justifiable in terms of their intrinsic social and political value and able to match in terms of size and ambition the US (often more military-oriented) programs*, and identified *energy conservation* among the target fields. Similarly, in commenting the Maastricht Memorandum by Soete and Arundel (1993), Mazzucato (2018) claimed that energy efficiency and security are among the key contemporary challenges that should be tackled through the “new” mission-oriented projects, requiring long-term commitments by public and private agents alike.

In the paper, the entrepreneurial State is modelled as a public agency investing in R&D projects that are too risky for private firms to engage with (relatively low probability of success in a given time horizon), but when successful, they spark a substantial advancement in technological opportunities. Such features are consistent with the

risk-reward profile of R&D projects carried out by an entrepreneurial State embracing *blue sky thinking* to pursue disruptive and pervasive innovations.

The energy efficiency of economic activity is upgraded in the model through a process of endogenous, bottom-up technical change (Gerst et al., 2013; Lamperti et al., 2018, 2020). Energy efficiency policies and their effects are analysed in a setup where the macro outcome depends on a myriad of decisions made at the micro-level, as it happens in real-world economies. More generally, agent-based modelling allows studying the effects of these policies in an evolving complex-system characterized by true, nonlinear, irreversible, and potentially path-dependent dynamics, in which aggregate outcomes emerge from direct local interactions among (typically heterogeneous and bounded rationality) agents (cf. Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017; Dosi and Roventini, 2019). These characteristics make this modelling approach particularly appealing to study green and low-carbon transition scenarios (cf. Vasileiadou and Safarzyńska, 2010; Savin et al., 2022).

The closest reference for our model is (Dosi et al., 2023), a version of the K+S model (Dosi et al., 2010) wherein the entrepreneurial State – in the shape of a national research lab – invests in R&D projects aimed to obtain a radical innovation characterized by higher labour productivity. In the present model, public innovation is directional, since firms can innovate in both energy efficiency and labour productivity terms, but the national research lab only targets energy efficiency innovation. Relatedly, the present model can be deployed to study the magnitude of the rebound effect from energy efficiency improvements (Gillingham et al., 2013; Stern, 2020). The model allows to investigate the so-called “macroeconomic growth” channel of the rebound effect (see Gillingham et al., 2013): an increase in the energy efficiency of durables spurs economic growth, which in turn calls for additional energy consumption via induced innovation and technological spillovers, or through fiscal multipliers in presence of idle resources.⁴ Last – but not least – difference, unlike Dosi et al. (2023), the model assumes that the adoption patterns of the new technology introduced by the national research lab can vary across technological regimes: under a Schumpeter Mark I regime, small firms are better equipped to collaborate with the State towards the diffusion of public innovations, whereas large firms hold the scene in a Mark II regime.⁵

Previous agent-based models dealing with energy efficiency have mostly focused on energy technology adoption by households, but none of those previous papers have tested the effects of mission-oriented innovation policies on energy efficiency.⁶ Our paper therefore fills a gap in the literature.

Our results show that energy efficiency is fostered by all policies being tested, yet a national research lab in the spirit of the entrepreneurial State is more effective than indirect policies based on taxes, incentives, and subsidies in fostering energy efficiency, while encouraging macroeconomic performance. The entrepreneurial State over-performs at least on the longer time horizon considered. Especially when improvements in energy efficiency spill over to labour productivity growth, the national research lab turns out to be a win-win policy as savings in energy are coupled with better macroeconomic dynamics, characterized by higher growth rate, lower unemployment rate and sounder public

⁴ Gillingham et al. (2020) also refer to sectoral reallocation, which is not accounted for by our model.

⁵ Another close reference for our research is the DSK model (Lamperti et al., 2018, 2019, 2020), featuring firms that invest in R&D projects to improve the energy efficiency, environmental friendliness, and labour productivity of machines.

⁶ See Moglia et al. (2017, 2018), Hesselink and Chappin (2019), Sachs et al. (2019). Some previous works have explored the role of firm-level innovation in affecting aggregate energy intensity (Gerst et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2020; Nieddu et al., 2022) and the ensuing macroeconomic effects (Saunders, 2013; Safarzyńska and van den Bergh, 2017; Hafner et al., 2020). For a review of agent-based models on climate-energy policy see Castro et al. (2020).

² Public entities and State-owned enterprises also offer advice services for business willing to invest in energy efficiency, thereby signalling the public commitment to the societal challenge. This is the case with KfW in Germany (see Mazzucato and Penna, 2016), as well as Enel X and Eniverse in Italy, spinoffs of the former public monopolists in the electricity and gas sectors.

³ For instance, recently Nokia Bell Labs have been selected for ARPA-E funding to develop energy-efficient data center technologies.

finance conditions. The superiority of the national lab policy, however, emerges on a relatively long time-horizon. In the short/medium term, indirect policies are more effective than the national lab. Furthermore, the possibility that the lab fails in inducing reductions in the energy intensity of the economy remains non-negligible even in the long run. Accordingly, our findings emphasize the importance of complementing a long-term approach, such as funding a national research laboratory, with more immediately applicable measures such as taxes and subsidies. Finally, our results indicate that the “macroeconomic growth” rebound effect generated by energy efficiency support policies is very small for most of the policies investigated. Accordingly, we conclude that the this rebound channel — often indicated as the rationale behind many of the backfire claims as highlighted by Gillingham et al. (2020) - is most likely overstated in the literature.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The empirical validation and performance of the model is analysed in Section 3. Section 4 explains in detail the policies tested and shows the results of the simulations. Section 5 concludes.

2. The model

The model is a general “disequilibrium”, stock-flow consistent, agent-based model, populated by heterogeneous firms, workers, and banks which behave according to heuristic rules. More precisely, the model extends the labour augmented version of the K+S model (Dosi et al., 2020; Amendola and Pereira, 2023) to include energy as an additional production input.

As in the DSK model (see Lamperti et al., 2018, 2019, 2020), technological change is endogenous and affects both labour productivity and energy efficiency. The intensity and direction of technical change results from a complex interaction between technological opportunities, market demand, relative price of labour and energy, among others.

The overall structure of the model is briefly sketched in Section 2.1. The most relevant features of the model, concerning the present analysis, are described in detail in the Sections 2.2–2.4. The details on the remaining structure of the model are spelt out in Appendix A.

2.1. Overall structure and timeline of events

Our synthetic economy is composed of four populations of heterogeneous agents, namely, F^1 capital-good firms, F^2 consumption-good firms, L^S workers and B banks, plus two institutional agents that are the government and the central bank.⁷ Energy is imported from abroad at an exogenous price.⁸ The basic structure of the model, graphically summarized in Fig. 1, is as follows.

Capital-good firms produce heterogeneous machines, using labour and energy, and invest in R&D, trying to produce more productive and energy-efficient machines in a more productive and energy-efficient way. Consumption-good firms combine machines, bought from capital-good firms, labour and energy to produce a homogeneous consumption-good. The demand for the consumption-good comes from the workers/consumers and the government. Workers define consumption level based on their current real income, their recent past consumption

levels and their accumulated wealth. Public consumption, instead, fluctuates around a constant percentage of the GDP. Energy is provided to firms upon request, never being a scarce input. Workers are hired in the labour market, which is built as a decentralized search and hiring process between workers and firms. Firms finance production in advance using accumulated internal funds and demanding credit whenever their internal resources are insufficient to finance desired production and investment plans. A fixed number of banks provides credit to firms according to the individual credit scores and the macroprudential regulatory framework, defined by the central bank. Finally, besides public procurement, the government levies taxes from profits and income of workers, pays unemployment benefits, bails out banks and sets the minimum wage.

Given this overall structure, in each simulation period, the following timeline of events takes place in the economy:

1. Policy variables are set by the government (and central bank);
2. Energy price is updated;
3. Workers update their skills;
4. Machines ordered in the previous period are delivered;
5. Capital-good firms perform R&D and advertise machines to consumption-good firms;
6. Firms determine desired production, investment, workforce size and credit demand;
7. Firms send/receive machine-tool orders for the next period;
8. Job-seekers send applications to firms;
9. The labour market runs and job vacancies are partly or totally filled;
10. Firms produce and pay wages (and bonuses);
11. Government pays unemployment benefits and defines public consumption;
12. Workers compute disposable income, pay tax and decide consumption demand;
13. Consumption-good market opens and market shares evolve driven by competitiveness;
14. Firms and banks compute profits, pay tax and repay debt;
15. Aggregate variables are computed;
16. Firms with near-zero market share or negative net assets exit the market;
17. New firms enter in the two sectors and the cycle restarts.

2.2. Production

Capital-good firms produce machines, on the order of consumption-good firms, using labour and energy.⁹ Four coefficients represent the technology of each capital-good firm, respectively capturing the labour productivity and energy efficiency of the machine produced and of the production technique adopted. More specifically, the coefficients $A_{i,\tau}^L$ and $A_{i,\tau}^{EF}$ represent the labour productivity and the energy efficiency of the vintage τ produced by capital-firm i , while $B_{i,\tau}^L$ and $B_{i,\tau}^{EF}$ refers to the labour productivity and the energy efficiency in the production of the machine.

Given the average monetary wage $w_{i,t}$ paid by firm i and the price of energy p_t^{en} , the unit cost of production of firm i is:

$$c_{i,t} = \frac{w_{i,t}}{B_{i,\tau}^L} + \frac{p_t^{en}}{B_{i,\tau}^{EF}} \quad (1)$$

where the two terms can be interpreted as the unit labour ($ULC_{i,t}$) and energy ($UEC_{i,t}$) cost of production for firm i in producing the vintage

⁷ The number of firms is indexed by i as an endogenous entry-exit process, with no imposition of zero net-entry, occurs in the model.

⁸ We represent an economy which is self-sufficient, but lacks the natural resource inputs for domestic energy generation. For the sake of illustration, our economy can be likened to an extreme version of the European Union, wherein energy generation is fully delocalized to extra-EU countries with richer and more profitable endowments of fossil fuels (e.g. OPEC countries) and renewables (e.g. North Africa for solar, North Sea countries for wind), intra-EU trade is 100% for all member countries, and European Commission directives are verbatim implemented in member countries. Stock-flow consistency is maintained by assuming that energy monetary flows are not reinvested in our synthetic economy.

⁹ Assuming no capital in the production of machines is a common and simplifying hypothesis typically adopted in the K+S models (see e.g., Dosi et al., 2010, and the later papers).




Fig. 1. Basic structure of the model.

τ . The price of the machine is then defined by applying a fixed mark-up pricing rule over the unit cost of production:

$$p_{i,t} = (1 + \mu_1)c_{i,t}, \quad \mu_1 > 0 \quad (2)$$

Consumption-good firms use machines, labour and energy to produce a homogeneous consumption good, under constant returns to scale. Firms plan their production according to adaptive demand expectations, trying to maintain a buffer of inventories over this expected demand to fulfil unexpected demand peaks (Steindl, 1952).

Given the quality of the machines held by the firm, the skills of the employed, the average wage paid by the firm ($w_{j,t}$) and the price of energy, the average unit cost of production for the j -th consumption-firm is the sum of the unit labour ($ULC_{j,t}$) and energy ($UEC_{j,t}$) cost of production:

$$c_{j,t} = \frac{w_{j,t}}{\bar{A}_{j,t}^L} + \frac{p_t^{en}}{\bar{A}_{j,t}^{EF}} \quad (3)$$

where $\bar{A}_{j,t}^L$ and $\bar{A}_{j,t}^{EF}$ respectively express the average labour productivity and energy efficiency of the production process, computed jointly considering the labour productivity and energy efficiency of the machines held in the capital stock and the skills of the employed. Consumption-good firms fix the price by charging a variable mark-up on the unit cost of production:

$$p_{j,t} = (1 + \mu_{j,t})c_{j,t} \quad (4)$$

The mark-up applied by the firms depends on their performance. Specifically, firms increase their mark-up whenever their market share ($f_{j,t}$) is expanding and decrease it when it is contracting (Phelps and Winter, 1970):

$$\mu_{j,t} = \mu_{j,t-1} \left(1 + v \frac{f_{j,t-1} - f_{j,t-2}}{f_{j,t-2}} \right), \quad v > 0 \quad (5)$$

The consumption-good market is characterized by imperfect information, implying that consumers do not instantaneously switch to the most competitive producer (see Rotemberg, 2008). Market shares, indeed, evolve according to a (quasi) replicator dynamics where more (less) competitive firms expand (reduce) their market share:

$$f_{j,t} = f_{j,t-1} \left(1 + \chi \frac{E_{j,t} - \bar{E}_t}{\bar{E}_t} \right) \quad \chi > 0 \quad (6)$$

where $E_{j,t}$ is the competitiveness of firm j in period t and $\bar{E}_t$ is the average competitiveness in consumption-good sector in the same

period. Competitiveness of firms, in turn, depends on the price they charge and on their ability to avoid situations of unfilled demand:

$$E_{j,t} = -\omega_1 p'_{j,t-1} - \omega_2 l'_{j,t-1} \quad \omega_1, \omega_2 > 0 \quad (7)$$

where $p'_{j,t-1}$ and $l'_{j,t-1}$ are the individual normalized price and unfilled demand levels.

2.3. Technological change

The capital-good sector is the place where technological change endogenously “starts” in the economy. Indeed, capital-good firms, striving to increase their market shares and profits, seek to improve their technology via innovation and imitation. To this aim, they invest a fraction (v) of their past sales ($S_{i,t-1}$) in R&D:

$$RD_{i,t} = v S_{i,t-1}, \quad s > 0 \quad (8)$$

The research and development activity is carried out by workers dedicated exclusively to this activity. Given the average monetary wage paid by the firm, the investment in R&D allows hiring a number of researchers equal to:

$$L_{i,t}^{RD} = \frac{RD_{i,t}}{w_{i,t}} \quad (9)$$

Researchers are split between innovation (IN) and imitation (IM) activities according to the parameter $\xi \in [0, 1]$:

$$IN_{i,t} = \xi L_{i,t}^{RD} \quad (10)$$

$$IM_{i,t} = (1 - \xi) L_{i,t}^{RD} \quad (11)$$

Innovation and imitation are uncertain activities and are modelled as a two-step stochastic process, as in Dosi et al. (2010). The first step determines whether a firm has access to innovation or imitation through two independent draws from Bernoulli distributions, whose parameters positively depend on the search capabilities of the firms (ζ_1, ζ_2) and the number of researchers employed in the two activities:

$$\theta_{i,t}^{in} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_1 IN_{i,t}}, \quad \zeta_1 > 0 \quad (12)$$

$$\theta_{i,t}^{im} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_2 IM_{i,t}}, \quad \zeta_2 > 0 \quad (13)$$

Akin to the DSK model (cf. Lamperti et al., 2018, 2020), firms accessing the second step of the innovative process draw four new technological coefficients according to:

$$A_{i,t}^L = A_{i,\tau}^L (1 + \alpha_{A,i}^L) \quad (14)$$

$$B_{i,in}^L = B_{i,\tau}^L (1 + x_{B,i}^L) \quad (15)$$

$$A_{i,in}^{EF} = A_{i,\tau}^{EF} (1 + x_{A,i}^{EF}) \quad (16)$$

$$B_{i,in}^{EF} = B_{i,\tau}^{EF} (1 + x_{B,i}^{EF}) \quad (17)$$

where x_A^L and x_B^L are independent draws from a $Beta(\alpha^L, \beta^L)$ distribution over the support $[\xi_1^L, \xi_2^L]$, and x_A^{EF} and x_B^{EF} are independent draws from a $Beta(\alpha^{EF}, \beta^{EF})$ distribution over the support $[\xi_1^{EF}, \xi_2^{EF}]$. This means that firms search new technologies in a four dimensional technological space centred around their current technology, with the support of each distribution defining the technological opportunities available for the firms along the corresponding dimension (Dosi, 1988).¹⁰ The lower support of the distributions is set to a negative value allowing for the possibility of discovering inferior technology. This reflects the trial and error processes associated to any search for new technologies.

Firms successfully accessing the second step of the imitative process have the possibility to copy the technology of one of the competitors. Imitation of technologically closer competitors is more likely. The technological distance (TD) between two firms (i and g) is defined as:

$$TD_{i,g} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{A_{g,\tau}^L - A_{i,\tau}^L}{A_{i,\tau}^L}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{B_{g,\tau}^L - B_{i,\tau}^L}{B_{i,\tau}^L}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{A_{g,\tau}^{EF} - A_{i,\tau}^{EF}}{A_{i,\tau}^{EF}}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{B_{g,\tau}^{EF} - B_{i,\tau}^{EF}}{B_{i,\tau}^{EF}}\right)^2} \quad (18)$$

If a newly developed or imitated technology is superior to the incumbent one along all the four technological dimensions, it will be definitely adopted. Otherwise, in the most likely situation when a trade-off is present, the decision is made by comparing the “expected potential success” on the market of the machines produced with the alternative technologies. More specifically, the “fitness” of the machine is assessed on the grounds of the rule followed by the consumption-good firms in choosing their machine-supplier, which is:

$$\min_{i \in I_{j,t} \subseteq F_t^1} \{p_{i,t} + bc_{i,t}\} \quad (19)$$

where b is the payback period considered by consumption-good firms in their investment plans, better described below. As the capital-good market is characterized by imperfect information, the minimization is carried out on the subset of the population of capital-good firms for which each consumer-good firm is aware of ($I_{j,t}$). The capital firm chosen is indexed as ji^* . The model thus entails local interaction among heterogeneous suppliers and customers.

Capital-firms decide the machine to be produced accordingly, namely by following this rule:

$$\min_h \{p_{i,t}^h + b\bar{c}_{i,t}^h\}, \quad h = in, im, \tau \quad (20)$$

where $p_{i,t}^h$ and $\bar{c}_{i,t}^h$ are respectively the price and the average (across consumption-good firms) unit cost of production of the machines associated to the different technologies.

This decision rule introduces a directed technical change dynamics into the model (Hicks, 1932). Indeed, the choice of the machine to be produced depends not only on the technological parameters but also on the relative price of labour and energy. More precisely, the “importance” of each technological parameter depends on the relative price of labour and energy. Thus, for example, an increase in the relative price of energy makes the technological parameters on energy

efficiency relatively more important, most likely inducing companies to adopt technologies characterized by higher energy efficiency levels.

2.3.1. Technological diffusion

Technological change becomes effective in the economy via firm-level investments in the consumption-good sector, for two main reasons. First, technological progress is embodied in the new machines, thus entering the production processes of the consumption-good industry through investments. In addition, as machines are produced on request of the consumption-good firms, new production techniques in the capital-good sector are applied only if there is an investment demand from consumption-good firms.

Firms invest for two reasons: (i) to expand their capital stock; (ii) to replace obsolete machines with new ones. Regarding the first channel, consumption-good firms calculate their desired capital stock ($K_{j,t}^d$) as a linear function of the desired production and, if the current capital stock ($K_{j,t}$) is lower than the desired level, firms invest in order to expand it. Desired expansionary investments ($EI_{j,t}$) are then equal to:

$$EI_{j,t} = K_{j,t}^d - K_{j,t} \quad (21)$$

Technological investments ($SI_{j,t}$) are based on a payback routine in which firms compare the benefits vis-à-vis the cost of the new machines, taking into account the horizon in which they want to recover their investment (b). More specifically, given the set of all vintages of machines owned by firm j at time t , the machine of vintage τ is replaced by the new machine if:

$$\frac{p_t^{ji*}}{c_{j,t}^\tau - c_{j,t}^{ji*}} \leq b \quad (22)$$

where p_t^{ji*} is the price of the new machine, and $c_{j,t}^{ji*}$ and $c_{j,t}^\tau$ are the unit costs of production of the new and old machine. Total investment is the sum of expansionary and replacement investments.

2.4. Government

The government levies taxes on wages and profits of firms and banks, pays unemployment benefits, purchases consumption goods for public consumption purposes, bails out banks, and sets the minimum wage. Additionally, in the policy experiments scenario, presented later in the paper, it engages in energy efficiency policies. Given that, public deficit reads:

$$Def_t = (w_t^u U_t + G_t^c - tr^\pi \Pi_t - tr^{In} In_t) + r^{deb} Deb_{t-1} + Bail_t - ET_t + G_t^{ef} \quad (23)$$

where U_t is the total unemployed individuals, G_t^c is the expenditures on public consumption, tr^π and tr^{In} are the tax rate on profits and income, Π_t and In_t are total profits and total incomes, $r^{deb} Deb_{t-1}$ are the interests paid on the debt, $Bail_t$ is the expenditure for banks bailouts; ET_t and G_t^{ef} respectively indicates the revenues from an energy tax and the public expenditure for energy efficiency policies, both zero in the baseline scenario (cf. Section 4 for more details).

2.5. Energy price

Energy is imported from abroad at an exogenous price determined on international markets. In this regard, in line with several available projections for the future (prior to the recent energy crisis) (e.g. EIA, 2020), we assume that the energy price grows at a positive moderate growth rate over time. This assumption is modelled in the simplest possible way, namely by assuming a constant growth (ξ^{en}) rate over time:

$$p_t^{en} = p_{t-1}^{en} (1 + \xi^{en}) \quad (24)$$

with $\xi^{en} > 0$.

Behind the increasing trend in energy prices there are some underlying assumptions. The first is that energy is mostly produced through

¹⁰ In the absence of specific policies directly affecting technological opportunities, we assume that technological opportunities are the same for labour productivity and energy efficiency innovation, i.e. the four coefficients are drawn from the same distribution over the same support.

Table 1

Main stylized facts reproduced by the model.

Stylized facts	Empirical studies (among others)
Macroeconomic stylized facts:	
Self-sustained growth with persistent fluctuations	Burns and Mitchell (1946); Zarnowitz (1984)
Fat-tailed GDP growth rate distribution	Fagiolo et al. (2008); Castaldi and Dosi (2009); Lamperti and Mattei (2018)
GDP, consumption and investment volatility	Stock and Watson (1999); Napoletano et al. (2006)
Cross-correlation of macro variables	Stock and Watson (1999); Napoletano et al. (2006)
Recession duration exponentially distributed	Ausloos et al. (2004); Wright (2005)
Pro-cyclical aggregate R&D investment	Wälde and Woitek (2004)
Pro-cyclical net entry of firms	Lee and Mukoyama (2015); Gomis and Khatiwada (2017)
Income, consumption and wealth inequality	Fisher et al. (2015);
Marginal propensity to consume lower than average one	Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010); Carroll et al. (2017)
Beveridge curve; Wage curve; Matching function	Blanchard et al. (1989); Shimer (2005); Cooper et al. (2007); Yashiv (2007)
Microeconomic stylized facts:	
Skewed firm size distribution	Dosi et al. (2007)
Fat-tailed firm growth rate distribution	Bottazzi and Secchi (2003); Bottazzi and Secchi (2006)
Productivity heterogeneity across firms	Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Dosi et al. (2007)
Persistent productivity differentials	Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Dosi et al. (2007)
Lumpy investment rates of firms	Doms and Dunne (1998)
Heterogeneous marginal and average propensity to consume	Dynan et al. (2004); Bozio et al. (2011); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014)
Hand-to-mouth consumers	Lusardi et al. (2011)
Energy-related stylized facts:	
Self-sustained energy efficiency improvements	Voigt et al. (2014); IEA (2019)
Declining energy intensity over time	Mulder and De Groot (2012); Voigt et al. (2014); IEA (2022c)
Negative correlation between energy intensity growth rate and GDP growth rate	Cseriklyei et al. (2016)
Beta convergence in energy intensity	Mulder and De Groot (2012); Voigt et al. (2014); Cseriklyei et al. (2016)
Induced technological change for energy efficiency	Popp (2002); Kruse and Wetzel (2016)
Low energy/labour cost ratio	Brännlund and Lundgren (2010); Cseriklyei et al. (2016)
Pro-cyclical energy demand	Moosa (2000)
Co-integration of energy demand and GDP	Ozturk (2010)
Energy efficiency heterogeneity across firms	Petrack (2013); KfW (2018)
Energy cost share heterogeneity across firms	Petrack (2013); KfW (2018)

fossil fuels that face increasingly near exhaustion. According to IEA's World Energy Outlook 2022 (IEA, 2022c), natural gas production is expected to peak within the next decade and oil around 2035, yet the projections in the IEA's Stated Policies Scenario indicate that the global share of energy from fossil fuels in 2050 will still be slightly above 60%. Second, the economy being modelled is a *small* economy importing energy from abroad, so that the energy price determined on international markets is only marginally affected by domestic energy demand dynamics. A last qualification concerns the interaction between energy efficiency, decarbonization, and energy prices. We acknowledge that projects involving the instalment of renewable energy facilities can deliver benefits also in terms of promoting energy efficiency. For instance, Wheeler et al. (2022) analyse energy savings associated to photovoltaic windows. Though, in our model innovation in energy efficiency should be conceived as unrelated to the carbon content of the energy used by the industrial firms. In other words, it does not enable the diffusion of low-carbon energy sources and it does not exploit them.

3. Simulation setup and empirical validation

As the model does not allow for analytical closed-form solutions, computer simulations are required to analyse the properties of the stochastic processes governing the coevolution of micro and macro variables (see Tesfatsion, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008; Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017). We rely on an extensive Monte Carlo (MC) experiment of size 100 to wash away across-simulation variability and robustly study the properties of the model.

The simulation setup is as follows. After a warm-up phase of 100 periods,¹¹ each simulation runs for additional 400 periods: the initial 160 periods serve to validate the model, while the subsequent 240 periods are dedicated to studying policy effects. As a simulation period can be interpreted as a quarter in the model, policy experiments are

conducted over a period of 60 years, which, in the following, we assume to be 2020–2080.

The validation period is useful to validate and calibrate the model, following an indirect calibration approach (see Windrum et al., 2007; Fagiolo et al., 2019). In line with a diffused practice in the agent based modelling literature, the model is validated through the replication of empirical stylized facts (see Dosi et al. 2010 and following papers; see also the discussion in Haldane and Turrell 2019). Given the goal of the paper, particular attention has been dedicated to energy related stylized facts. The empirical performance of the model is analysed in the remainder of this section. Policy experiments are extensively analysed in Section 4.

3.1. Empirical performance of the model

The model reproduces a wide range of macro and micro relevant stylized facts characterizing short and long-run behaviour of modern economies. Table 1 summarizes the main empirical regularities reproduced by the model.¹² In the following, we explicitly focus on the most relevant ones for the present analysis.

Table 2 reports a series of summary statistics over the 100 MC runs.¹³ As it emerges from the results, in line with the K+S tradition, the model produces endogenous growth dynamics coupled with business cycle fluctuations and rare but deep crises. At the business cycle frequencies, the co-movements between macroeconomic variables are in line with the empirical evidence (e.g. Stock and Watson, 1999; Napoletano et al., 2006). Particularly, private consumption, private investment, inflation and nominal wages are pro-cyclical variables, while unemployment rate and failure rate of firms are countercyclical

¹¹ The warm-up phase is useful for reducing the potential impact of initial conditions on simulation results.

¹² Precisely, the model reproduces the main empirical regularities matched by the previous versions of the labour augmented K+S model (see Dosi et al., 2018, 2020; Amendola and Pereira, 2023), adding evidence on energy dynamics.

¹³ The parametrization of the model used is reported in the Appendix B.

Table 2

Summary statistics for selected variables. 100 MC runs. Lik. stands for Likelihood. A crisis is defined by a 3% drop of the GDP in a single period which is not fully recovered in the next three periods. Lik. of innovation and imitation reflects the share of innovating and imitating firms.

Variable	MC average	MC st. dev.	Variable	MC average	MC st. dev.
GDP growth	0.025	0.004	Productivity growth	0.022	0.002
GDP volatility	0.063	0.031	Energy demand growth	0.018	0.012
Lik. of crisis	0.102	0.065	Energy efficiency growth	0.009	0.010
Lik. of innovation	0.202	0.012	Energy intensity growth	−0.009	0.009
Lik. of imitation	0.151	0.019	Energy/labour cost ratio	0.124	0.057

Table 3

Correlation structure. Bpf: bandpass-filtered (6,32,12) series. 100 MC runs.

Series (bpf)	GDP (bpf)								
	t-4	t-3	t-2	t-1	t	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+4
GDP	−0.111	0.174	0.549	0.872	1.000	0.872	0.549	0.174	−0.111
Priv. consumption	−0.153	0.131	0.502	0.827	0.975	0.885	0.604	0.257	−0.022
Priv. investment	−0.280	−0.140	0.061	0.247	0.389	0.349	0.280	0.205	0.169
Unemployment	0.017	−0.283	−0.595	−0.797	−0.810	−0.638	−0.371	−0.122	0.032
Inflation	−0.284	−0.103	0.124	0.273	0.277	0.164	0.025	−0.048	−0.028
Nominal wage	−0.098	0.022	0.149	0.243	0.279	0.264	0.222	0.183	0.164
Failing rate	0.159	0.029	−0.205	−0.460	−0.619	−0.600	−0.406	−0.129	0.111
Energy demand	−0.166	0.064	0.386	0.680	0.820	0.6745	0.497	0.194	−0.042

variables (cf. Table 3). Energy demand is pro-cyclical and coincident, in line with empirical evidence (e.g. Moosa, 2000).

Aggregate growth is primarily driven by technological progress, which starts with successful innovation activities of the capital-good firms and diffuses horizontally via the imitation activity of competitors and vertically via the investment of the consumption-good firms. The likelihood of successful innovation is around 20%, while the success rate for imitation activity is around 15%. As a result of these processes, average labour productivity and energy efficiency endogenously grow in the economy (cf. Table 2).

The positive trend of the energy efficiency explains why energy demand grows slower than GDP, turning into a negative growth rate for the energy intensity of the economic system. From a quantitative point of view, the average annual energy intensity growth rate is around −0.9. It is worth noting that in the model, the so-called structural effect driving reductions in energy intensity is not represented. Considering also that energy efficiency policies are not active in the baseline scenario, the simulated annual rate of change in energy intensity appears compatible with the empirical evidence of the last decades (Voigt et al., 2014; Fricko et al., 2017). A detailed representation of the MC average, first and third quartile of the energy intensity over the entire time period considered is provided in Fig. 2.

The positive growth rate of energy efficiency also explains why, despite the increasing energy price, the cost share of energy in the balance sheets of firms stabilizes over time. In this regard, an interesting indicator is the ratio between the cost of energy and labour, which is around 12% in the model, a value that appears to be aligned with the empirical evidence: 13% on average in a sample of 16 OECD countries (according to our calculations).¹⁴

The model produces other interesting macro and micro empirical regularities connected to energy. First, in line with Csereklyei et al. (2016), among others, the model shows a negative correlation between the growth rate of GDP and the growth rate of energy intensity (cf. Fig. 3 - left panel). A first explanation for this relies on the idea that a more prosperous macroeconomic condition can foster energy efficiency improvements. Indeed, endogeneity of technological change in the model can easily accommodate this explanation. A second explanation proposes the opposite directionality, namely increases in the




Fig. 2. Energy intensity over time. Logarithmic values. 100 MC runs.

Table 4

Results of a Granger causality test, based on Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). Entries are the p-values of the tests evaluated with alternative number of lags, the latter selected based on AIC applied to alternative runs. ***: p -value < 0.01; **: p -value < 0.05; *: p -value < 0.10. 100 MC runs. Data are aggregated at annual frequency.

	1 Lag	2 Lags
GDP growth → Energy Intensity	0.000***	0.00***
Energy Intensity → GDP growth	0.045**	0.003***

energy efficiency stimulate growth: higher energy efficiency levels, reducing unit energy costs in both sectors, translate into lower prices for machines and consumption goods, likely stimulating investments and consumption demand and growth. This explanation corresponds to a macroeconomic growth rebound effect (see Gillingham et al., 2013). The results of a Granger causality test, based on the test for heterogeneous panel data proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), highlight that both mechanisms coexists in the model, although results are stronger for the first channel (see Table 4). Thus, evidence of a macroeconomic growth rebound effect is found in the model.

¹⁴ The empirical energy-labour cost ratio refers to an average value in the manufacturing sector, computed using data from the OECD “Structural Business Statistics” database.




Fig. 3. Correlation between energy intensity growth rate and GDP growth rate (left), initial energy intensity level (right). Correlation stand for the Pearson correlation coefficient. 100 MC runs.

Second, the model shows a sort of “beta convergence” (among the MC runs) in the energy intensity level: in simulations characterized by high energy intensity at the beginning of the validation period, the ensuing rate of reduction in energy intensity is higher (cf. Fig. 3 - right panel). In line with the empirical evidence of a process of “beta convergence” across countries in the energy intensity levels (e.g. Mulder and De Groot, 2012; Voigt et al., 2014; Csereklyei et al., 2016), this result suggests decreasing returns to energy intensity abatement — it may be easier to reduce energy intensity when it is high, and increasingly difficult to further reduce it when it reaches low values.

Third, the model shows induced innovation features regarding energy efficiency, in line with several empirical studies (e.g. Popp, 2002; Kruse and Wetzel, 2016). Specifically, the model shows that an increase (decrease) in the energy price growth stimulates (weakens) the development and diffusion of high energy-efficient technologies in the economy. In particular, we find that a 1% increase in the energy price growth rate leads to a 0.6% increase in energy efficiency growth, while the energy intensity growth rate falls by around 0.65%.¹⁵

Finally, at the micro-level, in line with empirical evidence (e.g. Petrick, 2013; KfW, 2018), the model produces strong energy efficiency and energy cost share heterogeneity across firms, in both sectors (cf. Fig. 4).¹⁶

4. Policy experiments

We rely on scenario analyses to study the effects of several policies aimed at fostering the energy efficiency of the system. These policies are described in Section 4.1, while simulation results are shown in Section 4.2. Besides the main policy experiments, results for additional experiments are provided in Section 4.3.

Four policies are tested by comparing the average MC outcomes in terms of energy efficiency and macroeconomic dynamics obtained in the given policy scenario with average MC outcomes from the baseline scenario (Section 3). Three policies (energy tax; incentives to buy high energy-efficient machines; R&D subsidies) rest on a view of the State as “fixing market failures”. A fourth policy, called here *National Research Lab*, mimics the mission-oriented policies enacted by the entrepreneurial State in its “creating and shaping markets” role.

¹⁵ These results are obtained through the following steps. We include a stochastic term in the energy price equation, which becomes: $p_t^{en} = p_{t-1}^{en}(1 + \xi_t^{en} + \varepsilon)$, where ε stochastically varies across the MC simulations, but is kept constant within a given MC run. We then regress the average energy efficiency and energy intensity growth rate of each MC run on its ε value and use the estimated coefficients.

¹⁶ The energy cost share is defined as the ratio between the energy cost and the total cost, the latter defined as the sum of wages, energy, investments and interests on bank loans.

Parameters in the policy scenarios are set in ways that allow for a fair and unbiased comparison among policy tools.

4.1. Description of the policies

Policy I: Energy tax. In this policy experiment, the government relies on an energy tax to make energy more expensive, hoping this will incentivize the development and diffusion of more energy-efficient production techniques.¹⁷ Under this policy scenario, the price of energy effectively paid by firms increases by a factor $1 + tr^{en}$, where $tr^{en} \in (0, 1)$ represents the energy tax rate applied by the government.¹⁸

Policy II: Incentives to buy high energy-efficient machines. In this second policy experiment, the government tries to stimulate energy efficiency by providing incentives to consumption-good firms to buy machines characterized by high energy efficiency levels. Notably, under this policy scenario, when a firm acquires a high energy-efficient machine (A^{+++} machine), it gets a refund equal to $q\%$ of the purchase price. Machines are labelled as A^{+++} if their energy efficiency level is above an efficiency standard continuously updated by the government.¹⁹ Whenever a machine obtains the “ A^{+++} label”, this label, and therefore incentives for that specific machine, are guaranteed for the k subsequent periods.

The presence of incentives affects the decisions of the firms in both industries. Regarding the consumption sector, by making A^{+++} machines cheaper, this policy is expected to spur investment in such machines, thus accelerating the vertical diffusion of high energy-efficient technologies. More precisely, incentives affect the machine-supplier and the replacement investment decision rules, which under this policy scenario respectively become:

$$\min_{i \in I_{j,t} \subseteq F_t} \{p_{i,t}(1 - q_{i,t}) + bc_{i,t}\} \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{p_t^*(1 - q_{i,t})}{(c_{j,t}^* - c_{j,t}^*)} \leq b \quad (26)$$

where $q_{i,t} = q$ if the machine produced by the capital-good firm i is an A^{+++} one and $q_{i,t} = 0$ otherwise.

¹⁷ The model does not distinguish between green and carbon-intensive energy sources. Therefore, our energy tax is not comparable to a carbon tax.

¹⁸ To the extent that an induced innovation effect is at work, such a policy is manifestly obsolete in light of the 2021–2022 energy crisis. Soaring international energy market prices should provide enough incentives towards energy efficiency improvements. Governments in developed countries have moved in the opposite direction of setting energy price caps and providing energy subsidies, if any.

¹⁹ More precisely, the government sets medium-term energy efficiency targets for the consumption sector and progressively updates the standards towards these levels.




Fig. 4. Energy efficiency and energy cost share heterogeneity across capital-good and consumption-good firms. Kernel distributions.

Furthermore, in the capital sector, incentives may induce firms to adapt their technology and specialize in the production of A^{+++} machines to exploit the opportunities offered by the increased demand for such technologies. Particularly, we assume that in the case of A^{+++} machines, these machines are valued by firms considering a weighted average between discounted and undiscounted prices:

$$\min_h \{p_{i,t}^h(1 - \bar{\omega}) + p_{i,t}^h(1 - q_{i,t})\bar{\omega} + b\bar{c}_{i,t}^h\}, \quad h = in, im, \tau \quad (27)$$

where $\bar{\omega}$ is the relative weight attributed to the discounted price. It positively depends on the length of the incentives (k) and negatively on the average mortality rate in the capital sector.²⁰ The insight is that the longer the period in which firms expect to benefit from the incentives, the more they adjust their technology plans in response to the incentives.

Policy III: R&D subsidies. Under this policy, the government provides R&D subsidies to capital firms in order to stimulate their research activity. This policy is thus expected to boost the overall technological progress, hopefully triggering improvements in the energy efficiency dynamics.

The policy is implemented as follows. In every period, the government defines the total budget for the R&D subsidies (RDS) as a fraction (ς) of the nominal GDP:

$$RDS_t = \varsigma GDP_{t-1}^{nom}, \quad \varsigma \in (0, 1) \quad (28)$$

²⁰ This equation reduces to the standard one if $q_{i,t} = 0$, i.e. the machinery is not an A^{+++} .

In a version of this scenario, this total budget is then distributed to all firms proportionally to their past R&D:

$$RDS_{i,t} = RDS_t \frac{RD_{i,t-1}}{\sum_i RD_{i,t-1}} \quad (29)$$

In an alternative version of this scenario, which we call *III-bis*, the government issues a call for R&D projects and allocates a limited budget only to the private firms submitting the best projects and/or showcasing the best track record. To mimic this process, we assume that the government grants R&D subsidies only to firms with an above-average technological level on energy efficiency, in proportion to their past R&D:

$$RDS_{i,t} = RDS_t \frac{I_{i,t-1} RD_{i,t-1}}{\sum_i I_{i,t-1} RD_{i,t-1}} \quad (30)$$

where, respectively denoting the average energy efficiency in the production process and the average energy efficiency of the machines produced in the capital sector as B^{EF} and A^{EF} , we have:

$$I_{i,t-1} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A_{i,t-1}^{EF} + B_{i,t-1}^{EF} > A_{t-1}^{EF} + B_{t-1}^{EF} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (31)$$

Finally, in line with several empirical analyses (e.g. Dimos and Pugh, 2016), we assume an input additionality for the subsidy equal to one, meaning that the total R&D expenditure of the i th capital firm is:

$$RD_{i,t} = vS_{i,t-1} + RDS_{i,t} \quad (32)$$

Policy IV: National Research Lab on Energy Efficiency. In this experiment, the government funds a national research lab with a well-defined scientific mission: performing cutting-edge research to establish a new technological paradigm about energy efficiency that may significantly mitigate its environmental footprint. This policy scenario is meant to mimic the main features of an entrepreneurial state (cf. Mazzucato, 2013), exemplified by mission-oriented projects funded e.g. by the US Department of Energy, by ARPA-E and within the Energiewende in Germany.

The policy is implemented as follows. In every period, the government defines the budget for the national research lab as a fraction (η) of the nominal GDP:

$$RD_{NL,t} = \eta GDP_{t-1}^{nom} \quad \eta \in (0, 1) \quad (33)$$

With this budget, the lab hires a number of researchers equal to:

$$L_{NL,t}^{RD} = \frac{RD_{NL,t}}{w_{NL,t}} \quad (34)$$

where $w_{NL,t}$ is their wage.

In line with the literature on the entrepreneurial State, we assume that the staff of the national research lab work on energy efficiency projects with an extremely low probability of success, because they concern potential innovations characterized by a very low technology readiness level and are still surrounded by substantive uncertainty about their future commercial applications. Such features keep the private sector from investing, whereas only the public sector has sufficient financial means to take such high risks and the foresight to pursue the establishment of a new technological paradigm.

Furthermore, these radical innovations are rarely the outcome of a single research project, more likely being the result of a sequence of trials and errors where the cumulated research effort plays a crucial role (Phene et al., 2006; Kaplan and Vakili, 2015).

To capture these features, we model the probability of obtaining an energy efficiency radical innovation (EERI) by the national lab as a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter:

$$\theta_t^{EERI} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_{1NL} \sum_{k=p}^{k=t} L_{NL,k}^{RD}}, \quad \zeta_{1NL} > 0 \quad (35)$$

where $\zeta_{1NL} \ll \zeta_1$ captures the high riskiness of the research activities conducted by the national laboratory, and the summation of the laboratory's past research efforts captures the cumulative nature of the process.²¹

If the lab obtains an EERI, this generates a new technological paradigm (P), indexed as ($P = I, P = II, \dots$) (Dosi, 1988). Such a radical innovation enlarges the energy efficiency technological opportunities for firms. Taking inspiration from Dosi et al. (2023), we model this feature as a shift in the support of the distribution of energy efficiency technological opportunities available to firms:

$$\xi_{1P=I}^{EF} = \xi_1^{EF} + \theta_{P=I,t}^{EF}; \quad \xi_{2P=I}^{EF} = \xi_2^{EF} + \theta_{P=I,t}^{EF} \quad (36)$$

where the magnitude of the shift ($\theta_{P=I,t}^{EF}$) is paradigm- and time-specific. Such assumption conveys the notion that not all technological paradigms are equally “important” and that paradigms undergo a process of progressive exhaustion over time. This given, the shift generated

by each paradigm is modelled as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \theta_{P=I,t}^{EF} = \text{Unif} \sim [\theta_{min}^{EF}, \theta_{max}^{EF}]; & \theta_{min}^{EF} > 0 \quad \text{if } I \text{ discovered in } t \\ \theta_{P=I,t}^{EF} = (1 - \rho) \theta_{P=I,t-1}^{EF}; & \rho > 0 \quad \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (37)$$

where ρ determines the degree of exhaustion of a paradigm, which we assume to depend on the time elapsed since its implementation.

When a new technological paradigm is emerging, not all firms possess the capabilities to fully exploit it and different firm types may be better positioned to adopt it, depending on the technological regime (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984). Drawing on the classical “Schumpeterian classification”, we consider two technological regimes: Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II (C., 1982). Empirical evidence demonstrates the classification's remarkable ability to capture variations in innovation patterns across sectors, with some behaving predominantly as Mark I and others as Mark II (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Breschi et al., 2000). The actual diffusion of radical innovations obtained by public research agencies requires public bodies to issue calls for collaborations targeting private firms, that operate at higher technology readiness levels. The aggregate rates of innovation diffusion and the ensuing macroeconomic outcomes may well depend on the fitness of the firms involved in such public–private collaborations. In a Schumpeter Mark I regime, small and new entrepreneurial firms are supposedly the ideal vehicles for the diffusion of the new paradigm. Conversely, the national research should better target large firms in a Schumpeter Mark II regime. Comparing the two regimes is informative about the expected performance of the national research lab when the newly discovered paradigm implies a certain technological regime. For instance, one may wonder if a national research lab policy would underperform if technology diffusion occurred through SMEs with a high likelihood to go bankrupt.

In a Schumpeter Mark I regime, we assume that new paradigms are exploited only by the new entrants. More specifically, all the new entrants can immediately exploit the latest paradigm. Instead, we assume that in a Schumpeter Mark II regime, the exploitation of a new paradigm depends on the absorptive capacity (abs) developed over time by firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The probability that firm i in period t learns how to exploit a new paradigm is modelled as a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter:

$$Y_{i,t}^P = 1 - e^{-\varphi abs_{i,t}}; \quad \varphi > 0 \quad (38)$$

Absorptive capacity is computed as the cumulated R&D effort of the firms (Dosi et al., 2021):

$$abs_{i,t} = \sum_{k=t_0}^{k=t-1} L_{i,k}^{RD} \quad (39)$$

where t_0 is the entry period of the firm i in the market. In this Mark II regime, incumbents are more likely to exploit the new technological paradigm than entrants.²²

4.2. Simulation results

The effects of the policies discussed above are investigated by relying on scenario analysis of size 100, where each policy is compared against the benchmark “no policy” scenario over the period 2020–2080.

Policies are introduced in 2020 and last until 2080. Furthermore, to make alternative policies directly comparable with each other, we try

²¹ In this regard, $t - p$ is the interval from the last energy efficiency radical innovation obtained by the lab, if any. As long as no innovations are found, $t - p$ grows and so does the cumulative R&D. This will let the innovation probability tend to 1. This may sound biased towards the performance of the national research lab. Yet, notice that in our simulations this never happens as θ_t^{EERI} never exceeds a maximum value of about 15%, reached at the end of the simulation period if no successes have been obtained previously by the lab. The uncertainty in the outcome of the lab is thus ubiquitous in the model.

²² See Appendix for the details about how entry and exit processes are modelled.

Table 5

Rows report the average relative performance of each experiment with respect to the baseline (no policy) scenario. Stars reflect the significance of the difference between the experiment and the baseline, resulting from a Wilcoxon test: ***: p -value < 0.01; **: p -value < 0.05; *: p -value < 0.10. Failure rate is computed as the share of simulations for which, for each simulation runs, in the last year analyzed, energy intensity in the policy scenario is not below its corresponding baseline level. Rebound reflects the macroeconomic rebound effect and is calculated as explained in Appendix C. Evaluation period: 2020–2080. 100 MC runs.

Policy	Energy efficiency growth	Energy intensity growth	Energy intensity at 2080	Energy demand growth	GDP growth	Unempl.	Deficit/GDP	Failure rate	Rebound
Baseline	0.008	−0.007	4.243	0.018	0.024	0.142	0.019		
I	1.20**	1.20*	0.93	0.87*	0.98	1.09	0.82	40%	−3%
II	1.17*	1.25*	0.91	0.87	1.02	0.94	1.05	41%	4%
III	1.02	0.99	0.99	1.16***	1.18***	0.92**	0.90	48%	>100%
III - bis	1.42***	1.45**	0.88**	0.96	1.08***	0.84**	0.64	37%	59%
IV - Mark I	2.19***	2.17***	0.72***	0.61***	1.02	0.89**	0.71	31%	4%
IV - Mark II	3.42***	3.92***	0.41***	−0.03***	0.99	0.67***	−0.03***	13%	0%
II + I	1.60***	1.87***	0.75***	0.68***	1.00	0.98	0.67*	36%	−2%
III + I	1.41***	1.44*	0.85**	1.10	1.17***	0.95	0.48**	39%	>100%
III - bis + I	1.66***	1.75***	0.76***	0.87	1.08***	0.97	0.61	34%	56%
IV - Mark I + I	2.08***	2.24***	0.68***	0.61***	1.01	0.93	0.38**	17%	1%
IV - Mark II + I	3.37***	3.71***	0.42***	0.04***	0.99	0.75***	−0.42***	9%	−2%
II + I ($\tau^{en} = q = 0.25$)	2.32***	2.87***	0.59***	0.20***	0.93***	1.00	1.65***	23%	−11%
II ($q = 0.35$)	2.53***	3.51***	0.58***	−0.10***	0.85***	0.93	3.61***	21%	−21%
Spillover = 15%:									
IV - Mark I	2.19***	2.37***	0.67***	0.55***	1.02	0.86***	0.53**	28%	7%
IV - Mark II	3.50***	3.91***	0.44***	0.02***	1.01	0.65***	−0.13***	13%	16%
Spillover = 25%:									
IV - Mark I	2.29***	2.39***	0.65***	0.57***	1.04***	0.82***	0.45**	17%	4%
IV - Mark II	3.74***	3.98***	0.46***	0.04***	1.05***	0.65***	−0.47***	9%	10%

to keep their magnitude as similar as possible in the alternative policy experiments.

Specifically, the benchmark magnitude of each policy is set to 1% of nominal GDP. This magnitude can be easily inputted in policy scenarios III and IV, as it just requires to set $\zeta = \eta = 0.01$. Ex-ante imposing the same magnitude for the experiments I and II is more tricky, as the magnitude of these policies is endogenous in our experiments. We rely, therefore, on a trial and error procedure, where the goal is to find the policy parameters which, at least on average (across time and MC simulations), implies a 1% policy magnitude and allows scenarios to be comparable. For policy experiment I, this procedure suggests setting $\tau^{en} = 0.13$. For policy experiment II, choosing incentives lengths equal to three years (i.e. $k = 12$ quarters), this procedure suggests setting $q = 0.125$.

Table 5 reports the effects of the different policies on a set of outcomes concerning energy and macroeconomic dynamics. In comparing policy scenarios, we will track the effects of policies on energy efficiency, while taking into account whether energy efficiency improvements come at the cost of macroeconomic growth and public budget sustainability. We also evaluate the macroeconomic rebound effect induced by the policy, as described in Appendix C. Drawing on the distinction proposed by Gillingham et al. (2020) between rebound deriving from an exogenous energy efficiency improvement - “Zero-Cost Breakthrough” - and from an actual energy efficiency policy - “Policy-induced Improvement”, our estimates fall into the latter category. In other words, we capture the overall effect of a policy, i.e., the bundle of changes that occurs in the economy, including but not limited to energy efficiency.

Starting from policy scenario I, our results show that the introduction of an energy tax effectively fosters energy efficiency. The growth rate of energy efficiency increases by around 20% in response to the (13%) energy tax, leading to a decrease in the economy's energy intensity. This confirms our previous findings about induced innovation. By making energy relatively more expensive, the energy tax induces firms to search and demand relatively higher energy-efficient machines in the consumption-good sector and production techniques in the capital sector. The demand signal from the consumption-good firms also pushes energy-efficient innovation in the capital sector. Note, however, that the failure rate of this policy is relatively high,

failing to reduce energy intensity in the long run in about 40% of the simulations. The price signal is thus too weak in many cases to effectively shape the technological path of the economy. This policy does not stimulate macroeconomic growth, therefore no macroeconomic rebound emerges. Finally, the energy price increase leads to worsening unemployment statistics; hence, the energy tax revenues are needed to face additional unemployment benefit payments, threatening the public budget.

Incentives to buy energy-efficient machines (policy scenario II) are also effective in fostering energy efficiency in our simulations. This policy fosters the vertical diffusion of high energy-efficient machines and affects innovation strategies in the capital sector, pushing some firms to specialize in the production of high energy-efficient machines. Overall, the effect of the incentives is very close to that produced by the energy tax, with an increase in the energy efficiency growth around 20%. This policy produces a (not statistically significant) positive impact on the growth rate of the economy, which however is so mild as to be entirely dominated by energy efficiency gains. As a result, energy demand is lower in this policy experiment as compared to the baseline. The unemployment rate also falls, while the deficit/GDP ratio slightly increases.

Let us now focus on policy scenario III (R&D subsidies). Quite surprisingly, when the subsidy is provided to all firms, this policy completely fails in promoting energy efficiency improvements. On the other hand, this policy strongly stimulates the growth rate of the economy, which increases by around 20% compared to the baseline scenario, generating a huge rebound that makes this policy scenario a total “backfire” one. Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that in the absence of explicit guidance through public intervention and under the influence of market competition and selection, firms tend to allocate most of their received funds towards improving performance in areas that are highly rewarded by the market. As the energy cost share is typically small, firms will largely neglect energy-efficient improvements in the face of labour productivity improvements. As a result, the incentives generated by the market alone are not enough to push the energy transition, despite the additional public funds made available for innovation. Concerning other variables, together with the reduction in the unemployment rate, this tends to reduce the deficit/GDP ratio, making this policy self-financing. Finally, GDP and energy demand

grow faster and at similar paces, implying a relatively stable energy intensity ratio.

Results change when the government introduces a selection process in granting the subsidy, based on the energy efficiency technological level of the firms (so-called scenario III - bis). In this case, indeed, the policy is particularly successful in fostering energy efficiency. In details, R&D subsidies are more effective than both incentives for machine purchases and energy taxes, as the energy efficiency growth rate increases by approximately 40%. If R&D is characterized by increasing returns, concentrating resources on firms that deploy larger R&D budgets triggers a stronger effect on innovation than when subsidies are distributed to all firms. At the same time, in scenario III-bis the government provides subsidies to firms that are larger and therefore best suited to survive and to carry their innovations forward. The effect on growth is milder than in the policy scenario III (subsidies to all firms), but is still remarkably around 10%. Such a growth effect fully offsets the benefits of energy efficiency improvements, making this policy ineffective in reducing aggregate energy consumption due to a sizable macroeconomic rebound. Finally, unemployment and public budget deficit consistently fall in this policy scenario.²³

We are now ready to compare the above policies, based on a market-fixing view of the State, with a policy scenario styled after the mission-oriented approach of the entrepreneurial State. Our simulation results show that under a Schumpeter Mark II regime, the national research lab is very effective in stimulating both energy efficiency and macroeconomic growth and, not less importantly, is a self-financing public investment.

Let us review the results in turns. First, the national research lab is particularly effective in fostering energy efficiency, with energy efficiency growth rates doubling or more than tripling in this scenario with respect to those previously described, depending on the technological regime in place. In particular, Mark II clearly outperforms Mark I in terms of energy efficiency improvements and, consequently, in regard to energy intensity reductions. Although average dynamics are highly encouraging, it is important to emphasize that, at the level of a specific simulation, the uncertainty in the outcome of the policy remains high. This is particularly true for Mark I, where the policy proves unable to reduce the energy intensity of the economic system in approximately 30% of the simulations.

Focusing on other variables, the national research lab substantially reduces the unemployment rate. This, in turn, leads to a sizeable drop in the deficit/GDP ratio, as the government manages to save on unemployment benefits. This policy therefore tends to be self-financing.

Interestingly, there is no evidence of a macroeconomic growth rebound effect from this policy. In details, aggregate energy consumption in a Mark I regime is half that of the baseline scenario, while an absolute decoupling dynamic occurs in the Mark II scenario, showcasing a declining time path in energy consumption.

Note that, especially in Mark II, a peculiar dynamic concerning energy efficiency, GDP growth, and unemployment unfolds. More precisely, very high energy efficiency growth rates do not translate into higher GDP growth rates, while the unemployment drops. Why does this happen? Fig. 5 provides a possible explanation, showing that higher energy efficiency levels are reached partly at the expense of

Table 6

Rows report the ratio between the average MC in the failure counterfactual baseline sub-sample and in the success counterfactual baseline sub-sample for each policy experiment. Stars reflect the significance of the difference, resulting from a Wilcoxon test: ***: p -value < 0.01; **: p -value < 0.05; *: p -value < 0.10.

Policy	Energy int. in 2080	GDP growth	Unempl.
I	0.67***	1.04	0.75**
II	0.64***	1.02	0.80**
III	0.64***	1.00	0.68***
III - bis	0.65***	1.00	0.83**
IV - Mark I	0.66***	1.05**	0.77**
IV - Mark II	0.59***	1.06**	0.76*

productivity, especially in Mark II. This effect on productivity most likely explains why this policy does not yield a rebound effect at the macro level.

Now the question is why productivity may go down in this policy scenario. This occurs since the presence of the lab changes the relative technological opportunities between energy efficiency and productivity: firms may shift on a technological trajectory where progress in energy efficiency pays off more than labour productivity improvements. Indeed, due to increased energy efficiency technological opportunities, firms more frequently discover technologies characterized by levels of energy efficiency so high as to more than compensate for productivity losses.

4.3. Additional results

4.3.1. When policies fail

Previous results indicate that although many policies are successful in promoting environmental goals, there is a relatively high failure rate observed for some of these policies. The failure rate, defined as the proportion of simulations in which the policy fails to reduce the energy intensity of the economy by 2080, varies between 13% and 48%.

To explore this further, one important question arises: when do these policies tend to fail? To answer this question, we split baseline simulation runs in two sub-samples based on the policy outcome – success or failure – for each specific policy experiment within each specific run of the MC experiment.²⁴ We then contrast energy and macroeconomic dynamics within the failure and success subsets, presenting them as ratios between the former and the latter (cf. Table 6). The analysis reveals that most policy failures occur in benchmark scenarios characterized by low energy intensity, high growth rates, and low unemployment. This suggests that policies are less effective in positive economic and environmental situations where the economy already achieves energy efficiency targets on its own.

Furthermore, prior findings suggest that certain policies yield “by-product” macroeconomic benefits. However, upon closer examination of the results based on policy success or failure, it becomes evident that these benefits predominantly manifest in successful policy scenarios. Conversely, in failure runs, many of these benefits either disappear or are entirely reversed (cf. Table 7).

4.3.2. Policy mix

Governments rarely bet on just one “policy horse”, even less so on such a long time as we have simulated. A policy mix may exploit synergies among policy instruments while mitigating their stand-alone weaknesses.

²³ This targeted policy, along with other tested policies, may foster greater market concentration in the capital sector, potentially resulting in higher mark-ups within that sector. Yet, our model assumes fixed mark-ups in the capital sector. To check whether this assumption considerably affects policy results, we have re-simulated all policy scenarios in a fully flexible mark-up setting, wherein capital-good firms follow a mark-up rule akin to that of consumption-good firms. The results are extremely robust to this modification, indicating that the fixed mark-up assumption in the capital sector does not substantially affect the derived policy outcomes. Such additional results are available upon request.

²⁴ In practice, for each policy scenario, the random seeds in which the policy fails and those in which it succeeds are identified. This identification is then used to split the 100 MC no-policy runs into policy-specific failure and success sub-samples.




Fig. 5. Boxplots for energy efficiency and productivity in capital and consumption sector in 2080. Data are in terms of no policy scenario mean. 100 MC runs.

Table 7

Policy effects in successful and failure scenario. + (–) indicates that the policy produces a positive (negative) effect on the variable of interest with a significance level of at least 5%; = indicates an insignificant effect of the policy on the variable considered (significance level above 5%).

Policy	Successful runs			Failure runs		
	GDP growth	Unempl.	Deficit/GDP	GDP growth	Unempl.	Deficit/GDP
I	=	–	–	=	+	+
II	=	–	–	=	+	+
III	+	–	–	+	+	+
III - bis	+	–	–	+	+	+
IV - Mark I	=	–	–	=	+	+
IV - Mark II	=	–	–	–	=	=

Let us therefore analyse the effects of a policy mix obtained by combining policy I with policy II, III and IV in turns. Results for the policy mix are reported in the second block of Table 5.

From an energy efficiency perspective, our results show that a policy mix works better than a single instrument policy. However, results also reveal interesting synergies between policies, as well as redundancies.

In particular, among the tested policy mixes, we find an interesting synergy between an energy tax (policy I) and incentives to buy energy-efficient machines (policy II). Indeed, our results show that such a mix of indirect instruments allows the energy efficiency growth rate to increase by more than 50%, leading to a considerable reduction in energy intensity, without deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. This could suggest that high energy efficiency targets can be achieved through these measures by fine tuning the size of the incentives and the energy tax rate.

Simulations results, however, reveal that this is not as straightforward. For example, we find that a policy mix characterized by a higher

energy tax rate ($t_r^{en} = 0.25$) and incentive rate ($q = 0.25$) is effectively able to foster energy efficiency strongly but at the expense of growth, which sizably falls when this policy mix is implemented. A trade-off between energy efficiency and GDP growth thus emerges in this policy mix.

Other policy mixes, involving policy I, deliver only small benefits on GDP growth and unemployment, while the deficit/GDP ratio is statistically significantly reduced in most policy scenarios, showing that such policies mixes guarantee the sustainability of public budgets.

4.3.3. Indirect policies and the trade-off between labour productivity and energy efficiency

What if the government just relies on an expenditure policy based on high incentives? To answer this question, we test policy II with a high incentive rate: $q = 0.35$. Results show that this policy very successfully improves energy efficiency, but the negative effect on growth is even stronger than the one obtained in previous experiments. The growth

rate, indeed, slows down by more than 10% compared to the baseline scenario. This may be due to the fact that high incentives push energy efficiency at the expense of productivity, which indeed is strongly reduced in this policy scenario.²⁵ So, even when relying on a policy of incentives entirely financed in deficit, a trade-off between energy efficiency and growth emerges. Under this policy, in addition, the deficit/GDP ratio explodes. This shows the difficulty of sizably reducing energy demand through indirect policies.

4.3.4. Spillovers in the national research lab scenario

The national research lab policy experiments analysed so far are based on the hypothesis that radical innovations exclusively affect the technological opportunities for energy efficiency. However, this hypothesis neglects the possibility of spillovers across technological opportunity domains. It is not uncommon to observe spillovers to labour productivity from the introduction of radical energy-related innovations (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014).

To capture the existence of spillovers in the model, we modify the national research lab experiment in the following way. We keep all previous assumptions, except that a new energy efficiency paradigm widens the technological opportunities also for the productivity domain. More precisely, being $0 < \varsigma < 1$ the magnitude of the spillover effect, a new technological paradigm ($P = I$) alters technological opportunities as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \xi_{P=I}^{EF} = \xi_{P=I}^{EF} + \Theta_{P=I,t}^{EF}, & \xi_{P=I}^{2EF} = \xi_{P=I}^{2EF} + \Theta_{P=I,t}^{2EF} \\ \xi_{P=I}^L = \xi_{P=I}^L + \varsigma \Theta_{P=I,t}^{EF}, & \xi_{P=I}^{2L} = \xi_{P=I}^{2L} + \varsigma \Theta_{P=I,t}^{2EF} \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

The last block of Table 5 reports the results of the national lab experiment in the presence of spillovers for two different magnitudes of the spillover effect, i.e. 15% and 25%. When spillovers are not too small, the national lab policy produces a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP growth rate, which is about 4% higher than in the baseline scenario. This further pushes the unemployment rate and deficit down.

Faster GDP growth translates into a macroeconomic growth rebound effect, which, however, is quite smaller than the policy-induced benefits from energy efficiency. In this regard, it is interesting to note that energy efficiency improvements are fostered by spillovers, most likely because of the more prosperous economic conditions. All in all, thus, the presence of spillovers makes the national research lab policy a win-win strategy, as energy savings are achieved but not at the expense of growth or employment. At the same time, this policy is fully self-financing and does not put public finance under stress.

4.3.5. Assessing indirect policies vs. the national research lab over different time horizons

So far, energy efficiency policies have been evaluated over the entire time window 2020–2080. However, policies may need to prove their effectiveness on shorter horizons before they can find broad political support. For instance, within the European Green Deal, the European Commission has defined a 2050 long-term strategy aiming for the EU to be climate-neutral by 2050, and has updated the climate and energy policy targets to be achieved by 2030, including a 32.5% improvement in energy efficiency with respect to 1990 as the base year.²⁶ 2030 is also the year by which the European Union plans to become independent from Russian fossil fuels according to the REPowerEU plan.

In this section, we compare the most effective indirect policy mix, i.e. II+I, with the national research lab policy, focusing on the Schumpeter Mark II case (IV - Mark II), at 2030 and 2050.

The results of the experiment are reported in Table 8. As the results show, the assessment window considered really matters. In particular, if we consider the shorter horizon, that is 2030, the relative effectiveness of the two policies is the opposite of what was previously found. More precisely, while the indirect policy mix effectively improves energy efficiency and reduces energy intensity and demand, the effect of the national research lab in these directions is small and not statistically significant. The failure rate for this last policy is very high, approaching 50%. Moreover, the deficit/GDP ratio rises, in line with the lacking stimulus on GDP growth. Indirect policies act faster than the national research lab we have modelled, characterized by a much smaller likelihood of innovation for a given amount of invested resources. In this sense, our national research lab is more *patient* than the firms.²⁷

Yet, by 2050 all previous conclusions on the superior energy efficiency and macroeconomic outcomes of the national research lab are confirmed.

5. Conclusions

In the paper, we have relied on simulations of a macroeconomic agent-based model to study the effects of different energy efficiency-enhancing policies. The model extends the labour augmented version (Dosi et al., 2020; Amendola and Pereira, 2023) of the K+S model (cf. Dosi et al., 2010) to consider direct and indirect technological policies, as in Dosi et al. (2023), and energy and directional innovation, as in Lamperti et al. (2018, 2019, 2020). The analysis has focused on the innovation side of energy efficiency, as the outcome of R&D projects performed by firms in the capital goods industry and a public “national research lab”. Two broad policy perspectives have been compared. One endorses the traditional role of the government as fixing market failures, i.e. through energy taxes, subsidies to energy-efficient machinery purchases, and R&D subsidies. The other views the government as creating and shaping markets for new technologies that are not yet profitable for the private sector, as explored in the entrepreneurial State literature (Mazzucato, 2013, 2018). In the model, such a mission-oriented policy takes the shape of a national research lab investing a fraction of nominal GDP into R&D projects that have a much lower likelihood of success than those targeted by firms, yet may lead to the establishment of a new technological paradigm characterized by substantially broader technological opportunities for energy efficiency.

Our results show that although energy efficiency is fostered by all policies being tested, policy rankings can be compiled in terms of: (i) magnitude of the effect on energy intensity; (ii) effects on macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, unemployment, public budget deficit); (iii) timing of the effects.

In particular, our findings suggest that the national research lab is more effective than indirect policies based on taxes, incentives, and subsidies in promoting energy efficiency and reducing energy intensity, if we compare the policies across the whole simulation period (2020–2080). Alongside such results on the energy front, the national research lab policy is self-financing, as it helps mitigating unemployment and the associated unemployment benefits and therefore ameliorates the public budget. The national research lab also delivers positive effects on GDP growth if improvements in energy efficiency spill over to labour productivity growth. The “macroeconomic growth” rebound effect (Gillingham et al., 2020) generated by such spillovers is mild. Hence, adopting a mission-oriented approach proves to be a win-win policy.

²⁵ In particular, in this policy scenario, the average productivity level of the economy at 2080 is around 60% of the baseline one.

²⁶ A proposal for a revised Energy Efficiency Directive aims to increase the target to 36%.

²⁷ The superior performance of the national research lab on a longer time horizon may sound obvious, as the lab avails itself of a larger pool of R&D resources and its innovation process is cumulative. Consider, though, that ξ_{NL} is orders of magnitude lower than ξ_1 , as the entrepreneurial State is assumed to invest in innovative projects that are too risky for private entrepreneurs.

Table 8

Rows report the average relative performance of each experiment with respect to the baseline (no policy) scenario. Three evaluation periods: 2020–2030; 2020–2050; 2020–2080. Indirect policy: policy scenario II +I; National research lab: policy scenario IV - Mark II. Stars reflect the significance of the difference between the experiment and the baseline, resulting from a Wilcoxon test: ***: p -value < 0.01; **: p -value < 0.05; *: p -value < 0.10.

Policy	Energy efficiency growth	Energy intensity growth	En. int. at eval. period	Energy demand growth	GDP growth	Unempl.	Deficit/GDP	Failure rate
2030:								
Indirect policy	1.68**	2.01***	0.92***	0.47***	1.03	1.06	1.08	37%
National research lab	1.34	1.28	0.98	0.94	1.01	0.98	1.39*	48%
2050:								
Indirect policy	1.74***	1.90***	0.83***	0.57***	0.99	1.02	0.85	35%
National research lab	3.16***	3.04***	0.67***	0.11***	1.02	0.84***	0.28***	23%
2080:								
Indirect policy	1.60***	1.87***	0.75***	0.68***	1.00	0.98	0.67*	36%
National research lab	3.42***	3.92***	0.41***	−0.03***	0.99	0.67***	−0.03***	13%

It is worth noting that the policy outcomes are affected by the technological regime in place, although a mission-oriented policy keeps the top ranking regardlessly. Under a Schumpeter Mark II regime, wherein the new paradigm is primarily adopted by larger firms in the capital goods sector, the national research lab delivers a stronger reduction in energy intensity than under a Schumpeter Mark I. This highlights how a “positive relationship” between public and private innovation activities could facilitate the technological transfer between the national research lab and the firms (Mazzucato, 2013). At the same time, it warns that the magnitude of effects delivered by policies promoting energy efficiency may vary across countries characterized by different industrial structures and development stages and sectors.

Though, the timing of policy effects, as simulated by our model, may undermine the political support to a mission-oriented policy approach. We find that the national research lab needs more time than indirect policies to produce effects on the economy. Indirect policies, indeed, turn out to be more effective than the national lab when evaluated over a relatively short time window (10 years, i.e. up to 2030 in our simulated timeline).²⁸ In a sense, therefore, the national research lab is a long-term strategy (Geller et al., 2006; Kimura, 2010) - it would rather be adopted by a far-sighted government. At least two main policy implications can be drawn. First, indirect policies may be complementary to a longer-term, mission-oriented strategy, as they may keep the energy cost and climate change problems at bay in the short run while public R&D builds up new technological paradigms. Second, our findings suggest that a direct technology policy may be wrongly discarded as too costly and ineffective in the real-world political arena if short-termism prevails in guiding policy decisions. Governments may not have the patience and foresight to wait for the returns of long-term and risky investments made by the national lab (Mazzucato, 2013).

The model has also allowed to investigate the relevance of an indirect rebound mechanism, namely the “macroeconomic growth” rebound effect. In this regard, the simulation results are compatible with the idea that energy efficiency improvements can boost growth (cf. Table 4), but, as claimed by Gillingham et al. (2013), “the rebound effect is overplayed”. Indeed, most of the policies we have tested produce – at best – very low macroeconomic growth rebound effects. Particularly interesting is the national research lab scenario: apparently, the rebound effect in that case is mild because the lab changes the relative specialization of the economy, shifting the weight from labour productivity-enhancing investments towards energy efficiency improvements. The rebound effect is more pronounced, although still limited, when spillovers to labour productivity are assumed. Finally, strong indirect policies yield clearly negative effects on growth: instead

of generating a rebound effect, such policies help containing energy demand at the expense of macroeconomic growth.

Future research will need to overcome some limitations of the analysis just presented. First, the model does not feature climate-altering emissions from industrial and energy production. Interactions between decarbonization and energy efficiency are underplayed, as previously discussed. Based on the analysis carried out by Lamperti et al. (2018, 2019, 2020) through the DSK model, we expect that our results underestimate the beneficial effects of energy efficiency policies. Indeed, the DSK model assumes that increasing temperatures lead to climate shocks affecting labour productivity, capital stocks, and energy efficiency. The national research lab policy allows to save energy, for a given share of climate-neutral energy sources, and delivers only a very mild rebound effect. Therefore, in addition to the beneficial effects simulated in this paper, the national research lab may also mitigate the frequency of climate damages.

Secondly, the analysis could be expanded to an open economy framework (e.g. Dosi et al., 2019, 2021) to consider the possible effects of international trade and labour and capital mobility on the transmission of energy efficiency policies. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that unilaterally implementing policies to tax emissions or energy can pose challenges, potentially leading to a loss of international competitiveness, relocation of firms and production, and the occurrence of carbon leakage dynamics (Hoel, 1991; Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012). To address this concern, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) has gained traction and has recently been adopted by the EU (Böhringer et al., 2022). Investigating these aspects within an open economy agent-based model represents an additional interesting possibility for future analyses.

Finally, our rendition of a mission-oriented policy is admittedly simple. The literature sources on the entrepreneurial State make clear that effective mission-oriented policies involve “microstructure” aspects that would deserve a dedicated modelling effort. While this paper aimed to compare the aggregate effects of the entrepreneurial State with traditional, indirect energy efficiency policies, future research may explore whether and how the following issues affect the achievement of technical change and macroeconomic performance by mission-oriented policies: publicly owned firms potentially characterized by alternative corporate governance (Dosi et al., 2023; Guerini et al., 2022); the degree of decentralization of control; the blend of radical and incremental innovation pursued by a national research lab; learning effects across projects from a portfolio view of public R&D investments; consumers involvement in shaping the direction of technical change (see also Table 1 in Mazzucato, 2018). The latter issue leads to a final comment. We are aware that innovation is only a first step towards promoting energy efficiency. Technology diffusion involving residential users is a key issue in energy efficiency policy, as testified by previous research (see Introduction). Future research on the K+S and DSK class of models may explore how to incorporate household technology decisions, e.g. by updating the replicator dynamics equation.

²⁸ Bloom et al. (2019) suggested that indirect innovation policies are most effective in stimulating innovation in the short run, but did not compare them with direct policies.

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Declaration of competing interest

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Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2023.10.003>.

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