

overview

Dear friends of the ITPCM,

I am very pleased to send to all of you our warmest greetings from Pisa.

This issue of our ITPCM Newsletter is almost entirely devoted to Iran and we are extremely thankful to all those who contributed presenting their ideas and feelings about the present situation and the


future challenges this country is facing.

Iran occupies a high position in the agenda of the International Community and represents, according to me, a stress-test for the interna-

in this issue:

IRAN SOME REFLECTIONS

see also
about the ITPCM
Trainings & Research 2010-11
pp. 21-26



**Iran today. Messianic mood,
Twitter & facelifts.**

by Farian Sabahi, p. 3

**Iran in the Middle East.
Who is the regional power?**

by Arturo Marzano, p. 5

**EU-IRAN economic relations
& the new policy of sanctions.**

by Marc Botenga, p. 8

**UNSC resolution 1929.
Did Iran violate the NPT?**

by Emanuele Sommario, p. 11

**Iran state-aid reform.
Controlling the 'consensus'.**

by Carolina De Simone, p. 14

**IEAR:
the Iran Electoral Archive.**

by Chiara Pagni, p. 17

tional security mechanism. As a matter of fact all relevant actors, from the G8 to the G20, from the UN to regional organisations, from single States to NGO's have devoted attention and energies to the specific situation in that country.

The Final Declaration adopted by the G8 leaders meeting in Muskoka (Canada) on June 25 and 26, 2010, clearly outlined the two main areas of serious concern about Iran: first of all the issue of nuclear proliferation:

"While recognizing Iran's right to a civilian nuclear program, we note that this right comes with international obligations that all states, including Iran, must comply with. We are profoundly concerned by Iran's continued lack of transparency regarding its nuclear activities and its stated intention to continue and expand enriching uranium, including to nearly 20 percent, contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors".

Secondly the issue of human rights

"we urge the Government of Iran to respect the rule of law and freedom of expression, as outlined in the international treaties to which Iran is a party".

The Articles published in our Newsletter while highlighting the complexity of the issues at stake, offer a unique opportunity to better understand the present situation, the various interest involved and the positions of the different stakeholders.

In this framework we feel that every peace-loving human being and institution has to give his/her contribution to help changing this situation: the ITPCM is fully committed in this direction and is ready to contribute,

through our research and training activities, to prepare human resources to adequately deal with these issues. We have organized so far several activities related to Iran: from a research project on the present role played by Iranian civil society to the implementation of the Iran Electoral Archives (www.iewar.sssup.it) - a comprehensive source of information including laws, high quality documents, and academic articles on Iranian elections which constitutes a concrete answer both to the scarcity of available information and to the controversial debate growing around the Iran electoral Process.

In the second part of the ITPCM Newsletter you will find, as usual, additional info on new training courses which we are planning to deliver in 2010: you will notice that we are expanding the topics of these courses and trying to make them more and more focused on the specific needs of those serving in international field operations. You will find as well a few info about our Master Course on Human Rights and Conflict Management which is still open for application as well as on our PHD Programme on Human Rights, Politics and Sustainability, for which the Scuola offers various fellowships for both EU and non EU candidates.

As the next issue of our Newsletter is due to appear in December 2010, we would warmly invite all of you to send us short contributions about the activities they are carrying out or about specific issues they are dealing with: these contributions will make this Newsletter more appealing and vivid.

I wish to all of you and your families all the best and for those who will spend next weeks on holidays I wish a very relaxing period.

Andrea de GUTTRY
Director ITPCM

Contributions

pp. 3 - 23



by Farian Sabahi*

IRAN today

MESSIANIC MOOD, TWITTER & FACELIFTS

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Should we be afraid of Iran? These days I am rather scared by those threatening to bomb the Islamic Republic with the pretext of its nuclear programme. Iran insists that its programme is exclusively peaceful, citing the international treaty which gives Tehran the right to use atomic energy to produce power. Yet there remains deep diplomatic suspicion of Iran

in the West, and growing alarm that it is exploiting its civil nuclear programme as a cover to produce atomic weapons.

No doubt, Iran is a country arousing conflicting feelings: fear, apprehension, rage, hate and also love. This is a country where people have two antagonist modes of being and feel

trapped in between two irreconcilable world: East and West, tradition and modernity. The result of these antagonist modes of being is a sense of discomfort which the Iranian philosopher Daryush Shayegan calls «cultural schizophrenia». In the forward of his book (*Cultural Schizophrenia. Islamic Societies Confronting the West*, Syracuse University Press, 1997)

Shayegan writes: "This is an essay on the mental distortions afflicting those civilizations that have remained on the sidelines of history and played no part in the festival of changes". He adds: "We who were born on the periphery are living through a time of conflict between different blocs of knowledge. We are trapped in a fault-line between incompatible worlds that mutually repel and deform on another".

The Islamic world is struggling with modernity and reacting in different ways. Before the Revolution of 1979, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi opened to the West and to modernity, perhaps too fast. After the rising of the Islamic Republic the authorities have found two new pillars in faith and tradition. The liberal and reformist Shia clergymen of the Islamic Republic call for a revitalization of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning as opposed to *taqlid*, imitation) in the modern world to innovate the tradition and conciliate it with modernity.

Now 70 percent of the Iranian population are less than thirty-five years old. Many use Internet, Facebook and Twitter, which have been useful to communicate on the occasion of controversial presidential elections of 12 June 2009 and the following protests of the so-called green movement. However, paradoxically several others are waiting for the return of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam disappeared many centuries ago, and through the Jamkaran mosque near the holy city of Qum which since the mid-1990s has emerged as a site of popular in-

terest, epitomizing the revival of messianic aspirations.

The Jamkaran mosque is named after a tenth century landowner whose holy vision of the Hidden Imam with prophet Khidr provided him the excuse to build a humble shrine. This structure has two unique characteristics: it was recognised as a walking ground for the Imam and a dried hole on the back of the building, known as the "well of the Lord of the Age", serving as a channel of communication with the Hidden Imam.


As explained by the historian Abbas Amanat based at Yale University and author of *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism* (I.B. Tauris, London, 2009), "nearly three decades after the Islamic Revolution, the Iran of today is still rife with messianic aspirations". One would have expected that the Revolution would have put such yearnings to rest, at least for a while. Yet, after a decade of war against Iraq, the militant zeal of the Iranian revolutionaries was fading. The messianic tendency rose again in the mid-1990s with the re-emergence of the Hojjatieh association. The messianic mood was promoted by the reformists presidential victory of Muhammad Khatami in 1997 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, where the stubborn resistance of the Shi'i "convinced some in Iran that the course of events was a messianic precondition".

The co-existence of the different facets of modernity with such messianic aspirations is an example of the cultural schizophrenia affecting Iran. Sorting

it out will not be an easy task and Iranian artists are well aware of the situation. For instance Kiosk, a San Francisco-based band from Tehran, produced the song *Eshgh Sorat* (Love for speed) and posted it on Youtube with a video by the director Ahmad Kiarostami. On guitar and vocals, Arash Sobhani pokes at the contradictions of modern Iran when he sings: "No need for cardiologists/Just facelifts by cosmetologists/Immoral zealots, fanatic factions/Chinese-style economic expansions/Religious democratic droppings/Pizza with *Ghormeh Sabzi* (a typical Persian dish) topping..."

Founded in the early 1990's and evolving in the basements and private homes of Khatami's Tehran, Kiosk was celebrated as an underground band—as Wikipedia notes—"for its Mark Knopfler sounding melodies and its political but humorous lyrics". Such is the case of the following verses criticizing the authorities' decision to insist on the nuclear program and on supporting and funding the Palestinian cause: "Nothing for lunch or dinner to make/But let them eat Yellowcake/Scraped up the very last dime/Sent it straight to Palestine".

As mentioned before, sorting out this cultural schizophrenia will not be easy. After all, many centuries ago the XIII century Persian poet Rumi wrote: "I am neither a Moslem nor a Hindu/ I am not Christian, Zoroastrian, nor Jew/I am neither of the West nor the East". The impression is that Iranians have always coped with multiple identities. As second generations are currently doing.





by Arturo Marzano*

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IRAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHO IS THE REGIONAL POWER?

The fourth round of sanctions against Iran was approved by the United Nations Security Council (UN resolution 1929) after a series of long-lasting negotiations that the US carried out in order to reach the widest consensus. Nonetheless, the two Middle Eastern states that are temporary members

of the UNSC, Turkey and Lebanon, respectively voted against and abstained. If there were a widespread concern in the Middle East about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear armaments, how could the Turkish and Lebanese votes be explained? Is Iran perceived as a threat by its neigh-

bours, or has it become a regional power able to influence other Middle Eastern states' behaviour?

The type of relationship Iran has with the other countries in the Middle East can be understood according to a framework: the so-called "moderate



Arab countries” competing with the so-called “axis of evil”. On one side, there are Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, while on the other side there are Iran, Syria, and two Islamist organizations, *Hizballah*, and *Hamas*, which enjoy high levels of political support respectively in Lebanon and in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), mainly Gaza. If this framework is useful to understand what is going on in the Middle East at a general level, some details are needed in order to depict a more nuanced picture. Specifically, what is the other Arab states’ position? Which side does Turkey support? What is the role of Israel in this situation?

The most important element of this framework is the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They are competing for regional leadership by exploiting the Islamic division between Sunnis and Shiites and by using “proxies”, similarly to what the US and the USSR did in the past. The dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran explains the Lebanese vote in the UNSC. Abstention was the only way not to jeopardize the stable, yet difficult, relationship between Lebanese Sunnis and Shiites. Lebanese Sunni prime minister Saad

Hariri is a very close ally of Saudi Arabia, while the Shiite parties Amal and Hizballah – which are part of the national-unity cabinet – are linked to Iran and Syria. After Lebanon being on the verge of a new civil war for almost two years, on May 21, 2008 the two sides reached an agreement in Doha, thanks to the arrangements that Iran and Saudi Arabia had previously achieved. A different vote in the UNSC would risk endangering both the internal and the regional scenario.

If Lebanon is currently not a battlefield between Teheran and Riyadh any more, other contexts like Iraq and the oPt still provide ingredients for further rivalry. After that the 1979 revolution completely jeopardized the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two states experienced phases of high tension (in the 1980s) and periods of better understanding (at the end of the 1990s). Despite “idyllic” moments – like the visit of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Riyadh in 2007 or the first-ever participation of Iran in the annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting – the 2008-09 war in Gaza and the bitter critics Ah-

madinejad directed against the Saudis for using too soft tones in denouncing the Israeli attack worsened the relationship. Moreover, every attempt to reach an agreement between the two main Palestinian factions – the Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed Fatah and the Syria and Iran sponsored Hamas – failed so far. At the same time, Teheran and Riyadh are highly competing to shape the Iraqi political context: specifically, Saudi Arabia has been trying to prevent Iran from endorsing a unique Shiite parties coalition that would reduce the role of the Sunnis in the yet-to-be established new government.

Two Arab states that are quite active in the diplomatic Middle Eastern scenario and are dialoguing both with Iran and the “moderate” side are the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. The UAE have agreed to enforce the recently UNSC sanctions against Iran, most probably due to US pressures. Yet, it will not be an easy task, since 400,000 Iranian businessmen are working in the Emirates, the trade between Iran and the UAE is about 10 billions \$ a year, and it is quite known that Dubai, one of the seven Emirates,



is the main “door” to let foreign investors, mainly Europeans, trade with Iran. On the contrary, Qatar does not seem ready to enforce the new sanctions, and its Emir has openly supported Iran’s right to nuclear technology. After voting against the first round of sanctions in 2006, when it was member of the UNSC, Qatar has maintained a dual-track dialogue: on one side, excellent relationships with the US, and even some attempts to re-establish economic ties with Israel; on the other side, fruitful connections with Iran as the February 2010 agreement for defence cooperation shows.

In this fluid situation, Turkey and Israel are also playing a relevant role. In the last years, while Istanbul and Jerusalem have moved from a close partnership to a tense relationship, Iran’s liaisons with the two other non-Arab Middle East countries have gone through interesting changes. Why did Turkey, a western-oriented and secular state, a member of NATO and a strict partner of the US, vote against the sanctions? Is it to be considered a proof of the Islamic drift Erdogan’s government is imposing to Turkey? Istanbul clearly wanted to defend the deal it had reached with Brazil and Iran a few weeks earlier. This is also the reason why Brazil voted against the new round of sanctions. At the same time, such behaviour is in line with the new Turkish foreign policy. Istanbul is taking advantage of a sort of “vacuum” in the Arab world - due to the collapse of Iraq and the weakness of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are more and more perceived by the Arab public opinion as too pro-American – to become a reference for Arab countries and to challenge Iran in its ambition to be a regional super-power. The increasing criticism against Israel, the backing of Hamas, and the pro-Syrian

and pro-Iranian stances are part of a strategy Istanbul is carrying out in order to assume a leadership role in the Sunni Arab world, in competition with Teheran. Actually, the Freedom Flotilla episode demonstrates the good results of this policy, since recent polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research highlight that 43% of the Palestinians consider Turkey as the regional most supportive country of their cause, while only 6% mention Iran. Will such a trend be confirmed in other Arab countries, as well? Will it bring to tensions between Ankara and Teheran in the long run? While it is too early to reply to these questions, it is not premature to state that Turkey is already challenging other states’ ambition to regional leadership.

The Israeli-Iranian relationships have dramatically worsened in the last years, since Teheran’s nuclear plans have been clear. After a thirty year long honeymoon, which lasted until the 1979 revolution, Israel and Iran completely interrupted their diplomatic relationship. Yet, the mid-1980s Israeli decision to sell arms to Iran, in order to balance Saddam Hussein’s growing power, demonstrates that the two states pragmatism might overcome ideological closures, as it happened during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran keeps depicting Israel and the US as the main enemies of the Islamic revolution and constantly uses harsh tones to refer to the “Zionist entity”. However, Israel and Iran share lots of common aspects. Both the two countries’ populations represent religious and ethnic minorities in the mainly Sunni and Arab Middle East. Both of them have a young, secular, highly educated and Western-oriented society. From a geopolitical point of view, Jerusalem and Teheran are natural allies in the Middle East, and their economies would

perfectly integrate one with the other. Israel could provide Iran with all technologies it needs to develop its huge natural resources, while Iran could sell oil and natural gas to Israel, as it used to be under the Shah. Clearly, unless a change of regime in Iran occurs, there is no way that the Israeli-Iranian relationship might go through any transformation. On the contrary, there is high risk of dramatic worsening: the possibility of an Israeli armed attack against the Iranian nuclear sites, as it happened in 1981 in Iraq and in 2007 in Syria. The recent rumours according to which Saudi Arabia agreed to allow Israel to use its airspace to attack Iran confirm how tense is the situation.

On top of that, the US policy has to be taken into consideration. Despite the new round of sanctions – whose aim is also to avoid an Israeli armed attack that might destabilize the entire area – Washington is still trying to negotiate with Teheran, as much as it seeks to move Damascus away from the “axis” with Iran.

In the next future, no crucial change in the Iranian-Saudi rivalry is to be foreseen, and the new Turkish foreign policy might have concrete consequence in the Middle East only on the long run. At the same time, an Israeli armed attack against Teheran is not to be envisaged, at least during the Obama presidency. Therefore, the main challenge to the relationships Iran is having with its neighbours is represented by the effectiveness of the sanctions: if the international community – and therefore the Middle Eastern countries – enforced them, the entire set of Iranian relationships would undergo a major shift. However, the determination and the ability to implement UN resolution 1929 still need to be assessed.



by Marc Botenga*

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EU-IRAN's ECONOMIC RELATIONS & the NEW POLICY OF SANCTIONS

Iran is central to many of the security threats faced by EU Member States. It causes concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is considered a major sponsor of terrorism and wields the kind of influence in Iraq and Afghanistan the EU can only dream of. Geographically the country is well-positioned to bring the gas of

countries in the Caspian basin to the world markets and its own energy resources make it potentially vital to EU energy security. Notwithstanding the diversity of these security issues and challenges however, the EU seems to centre its Iran policy around the nuclear question. More importantly, in what is a clear policy shift, the EU has

abandoned its traditional prudence on using coercive measures to become one of the most ardent advocates of so-called crippling sanctions. But is it paying off?

That the EU used to take a softer stance on Iran, preferring direct negotiations over punitive measures was no

coincidence. The EU had more to lose than the US. Iranian-American trade relations, albeit not non-existent, have never been very significant since the revolution. Benefiting from the US withdrawal from the country however, many EU member states, and especially Germany, France and Italy, developed important trade links with Iran. In 2007, before the latest round of sanctions, the German Ministry of Finance calculated that tough sanctions on the Iranian economy, including Bank Melli, could cost Germany over €2 billion. According to the Italian-Iranian Chamber of Commerce (IICC) between 2002 and 2005 the value of Italy's imports from Iran increased from almost €1.9 billion to €2.9 billion, while exports to Iran increased similarly from €1.8 to €2.2 billion. As trade between both countries amounted to €5.7 billion over 2006 (Eurostat, Maronta 2007), compared to €4.4 billion between Iran and Germany, Italy temporarily overtook Germany as Iran's main European trade partner. Iranian-Dutch and Iranian-French trade on the other hand were both worth around €4.2 billion. Unsurprisingly, investments in the energy sector (Eni-Agip, Total-Fina-Elf) and imports of hydrocarbons always had primary importance.

Things are changing however. Although the EU collectively still appears the biggest import and, after China, the second biggest export partner of Iran, Eurostat (Makinsky, 2009) observes that trade between the EU and Iran decreased by 7 percent between 2006 and 2007. The decline was strongest in EU exports 9.9%, while imports from Iran decreased by 3.2%. But the same sources report that while German-Iranian and French-Iranian trade went down by respectively 9% and 8%, trade between Italy and Iran still increased by around 5% over 2007. The increase was, however, partially due to higher oil prices and a 2010 IICC report showed that in 2009 Italian-Iranian trade followed the general EU tendency, dropping drastically from €6 billion to less than €4 billion. Over the same year, German-Iranian trade dropped another 5.8%. A decrease the German Foreign Office expects to continue.

EU sanctions, reinforced and/or amended yearly since the end of 2006, explain part of this evolution. Even with the nuclear negotiations still ongoing however, diverse member states were already pushing their national companies for divestment. The process is partly self-reinforcing. Pre-emptive divestment makes sanctions less painful for the EU, while sanctions strengthen divestment. Last month, not satisfied with UNSC Resolution 1929, EU leaders approved new unilateral sanctions against Tehran. In addition to banning shipping and air cargo companies from EU territory, the sanctions included a ban on investments, technical assistance and technology transfers to the oil and gas industry.

But the change in policy is more substantial still. The 2005 Framework for a Long-Term Agreement proposed by the EU troika offered EU support for Iran's WTO-candidacy, enhanced trade relations and agreed to facilitate Iran's access to advanced technologies and spare parts for civil aviation. It recognised Tehran's positive contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan and spoke of a possible regional security agreement in "*close consultation with all the States in the region*". In exchange Iran would stop all support to terrorist groups, increase anti-drug cooperation and submit to more stringent weapons inspections. However, although the proposal seemed to use the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a legal basis, Iran noted that, contrary to the NPT, it did not guarantee the country's right to uranium enrichment and therefore turned it down. Notwithstanding declarations to the contrary, EU action is indeed no longer based on the NPT. Backed by the US and, subsequently, the UNSC, the EU clearly wants Iran to go beyond its NPT-obligations and renounce its right to uranium enrichment.

If Iran has in the past proven ready to do so, it now seems unwilling to even consider it. All the more so since the EU has been unable and, increasingly, unwilling to offer anything significant in return. The 2005 Framework offered some security guarantees, but these remained hollow without US

support. Significantly, the 2008 5+1 proposal, supported by the US, replaced security guarantees by promises of support for a "*conference to promote dialogue and co-operation*". Promises on economic co-operation were worded rather more vaguely as "*improving Iran's access to the international economy*", "*the possible removal of restrictions*" and "*possible access to US and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment*". Of the 2005 incentives only the energy partnership and support for telecommunication and internet provision remained. With the latter being seen by Iran as a way of promoting regime change, the proposal never stood a real chance.

This lack of solid guarantees also flawed the EU-version of the "uranium-swap proposal". By swapping Iran's uranium for nuclear fuel the EU hoped to make sure that the uranium would not be used for military purposes. According to Iran the proposal implicitly recognised its right to enrich uranium, and Tehran therefore agreed to it in principle. It did however ask for guarantees on how and when the uranium would be returned. Once again the Iranians were turned down. And when Turkey and Brazil succeeded in concluding an – imperfect – uranium-swap agreement, the EU joined the US in a rush to sanctions.

The new EU policy and sanctions are already yielding results, just not the ones hoped for. With the EU scaling down trade, both the United Arab Emirates and China have increased their relative share of Iranian foreign trade. Chinese competitors, as Zhen-Hua Oil, are replacing EU companies in the strategic Iranian energy sector. The withdrawal of Western companies reinforces military dictatorship by enabling the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to strengthen its hold on the economy. Internationally, Tehran has become less cooperative on Afghanistan, stands firmly as ever with Hezbollah and Hamas, and still refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. That the Iranian government denounces the absence of any international legal basis for the UNSC resolutions comes as no surprise, but even China, Turkey, and Brazil are unimpressed by the shift

from the NPT towards more politically inspired UNSC resolutions.

Economically and strategically unproductive at best, counterproductive at worst, Europe's new policy begs the question what ultimate policy objective warrants it. Not concern over proliferation one must hope. As Ehud Barak, General Abizaid and Van Creveld observed: considering the West's nuclear superiority, an Iranian bomb would have a deterring effect at best. In fact, rather than destabilise the region, an Iranian nuclear weapon might actually re-stabilise it by neutralising Israel's comparative advantage. Sacrificing the broad range of EU interests out of concern for the bomb would therefore be rather insensible. Fortunately, non-proliferation is unlikely to be the new policy's objective.

If it were, the Union would suspend support for the Indian nuclear programme and pressure Israel and Pakistan to abandon their arsenal, rather than harass a signatory party to the NPT.

There is no secret to it. The trouble with Iran is not the bomb, but the regime. Shahram Rubin writes: *"Ironically, Tehran recognizes that the real issue is the regime itself. It argues that the West's focus on the nuclear issue is merely an excuse - an opening wedge - to achieve regime change. This, they conclude, means that any substantive compromise or concession on their part will only lead to a series of escalating demands that will empty Iran of its revolutionary content, in other words, lead to regime change."* Regime change might seem an attractive option indeed. There is one problem

with using sanctions to promote it however: the sanction track record in achieving regime change is not good. Five decades of sanctions never once destabilised the Cuban government, the sanctioned DPR Korea is still very much alive and the Iraq embargo hit the population hard, but reinforced Saddam's hold on power. Furthermore, Iran is much less isolated than any of those countries ever were, so even if the scope is to weaken Iran in order to make military regime change less risky, success is unsure. Chances are that the EU will have to deal with the Islamic Republic for quite a while still. Considering the interests at stake, it would do well to weigh its options very carefully before offering Iran to competitors.





by Emanuele Sommario*

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UNSC Res. 1929 DID IRAN VIOLATE THE NPT?

the perspective of compliance with international law

On 29 June 2010 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1929 on “Non-proliferation” which imposes a fourth round of sanctions on Iran for failing to halt

its nuclear enrichment program. The Resolution was passed under Article 41 of the Charter, which means that a) the matter is considered by the UNSC as one of concern

to international peace and security and b) the Resolution’s provisions are binding on all UN member States, including Iran itself.

The first batch of UN-sanctions were meted out in December 2006 through Resolution 1737 as a reaction to Iran's failure to comply with previous Council's demands that it "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development". The measures adopted included the blocking of the import or export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and the freezing of financial assets of persons or entities (listed in an annex to the document) supporting Teheran's nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. The second and third round of sanctions were imposed with resolutions 1747(2007) and 1803(2008) respectively, as Iran still refused to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects and contested the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) right to verify the information provided to it. The sanctions regime was tightened by establishing a ban on Iranian arms sales and by expanding the freeze on assets. In addition, the Council encouraged scrutiny of the dealings of Iranian banks and called upon countries to inspect cargo planes and ships entering or leaving Iran if there were "reasonable grounds" to believe they were carrying goods prohibited by previous resolutions.

Resolution 1929 once more highlighted the proliferation risks posed by Iran's nuclear programme and the country's continued failure to cooperate with the IAEA. The text builds on previous sanctions by deciding that Iran shall not acquire an interest "in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology". The UNSC also decided that all States shall prevent the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.

Twelve of the Council's fifteen

members voted for the Resolution, two voted against, with one abstention (Lebanon). The negative votes were cast by Brazil and Turkey who had recently brokered a deal with Teheran on nuclear fuel exchange and whose representatives at the UN expressed concerns that the sanctions could close the door to a negotiated solution. The Brazilian ambassador to the UN even maintained that the new restrictions "will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will play into the hands of people on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail".

Iran and its (non-)compliance with the Non-proliferation treaty

But why can Iran not freely implement nuclear development projects as it sees fit (including military ones) in the same way as other States have done in the past? Which international legal obligations is Teheran breaching by pursuing its contested nuclear program? All started in 1970, when the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (a.k.a. the "Non-proliferation treaty", NPT) came into force. The negotiating States were aware of "the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war" and of the consequent need to "make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples". While the main goal of this instrument back in the 70s and 80s was to defuse the nuclear standoff between the superpowers, its provisions remain applicable and have become increasingly relevant as nuclear technology has become more available and affordable.

The treaty imposes different obligations on so-called "nuclear-weapon States" (which it defines as those having "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967", i.e. the USA, France, the UK, China and the Russian Federation), as opposed to "non nuclear-weapon States". The latter

are bound by the treaty, inter alia, "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Article II). Iran, which has signed and ratified the treaty, has been bound by its terms since 1970.

Over the last few years, Iran has maintained that its nuclear development program serves purely civilian purposes and is therefore permitted under the NPT, which guarantees the "inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination (Article IV)". So who decides whether Teheran is living up to its obligations?

Article III of the NPT obliges each "non nuclear-weapon State" to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the implementation of "safeguards" for the purpose of verifying that the Parties to the treaty fulfill their obligations. These are intended "to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". "Safeguards" are a set of activities (such as on-site inspections or the review of periodic reports by the State parties) by which the IAEA seeks to implement its mandate. Iran already concluded a "Safeguards Agreement" with the IAEA in 1973. Under its terms, Iran is required to ensure the transparency of its nuclear program and allow for independent verification that nuclear materials are not being diverted to military applications. According to the IAEA Statute – which is binding on all State Parties to the NPT – the IAEA Board of Governors is authorized to make findings of non-compliance with respect to obligations stemming from the "Safeguard Agreement" and it may ask the non-complying state to remedy the breach.

This is exactly what happened with respect to Iran. In 2002, Iranian political dissidents exposed the existence of two nuclear facilities which,

once operational, would be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. While the existence of these installations did not per se violate Iran's commitment not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, neither of them had been declared by Iran to the IAEA as demanded by the "Safeguards Agreement". In the same months, IAEA inspectors discovered additional undeclared nuclear activities, leading IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei to conclude in 2003 that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement", a conclusion subsequently endorsed by the Board of Governors.

To ease mounting international pressure, Iran announced that it would suspend its uranium enrichment activities and sign an Addi-

tional Protocol to its "Safeguards Agreement", granting the IAEA greater inspection authority over Iran's facilities. However, the Iranian Parliament never ratified the Additional Protocol and in August 2005, following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran announced that it would resume uranium enrichment.

Teheran's stance ultimately prompted the Board of Governors to refer the matter to the UN Security Council in February 2006. The following month the Council issued a Presidential Statement calling upon Iran to re-suspend uranium enrichment and ratify and implement the Additional Protocol. Iran, however, did not take these steps, and this led to the adoption of Resolution 1696, in which the Council gave Iran a formal deadline (31 August 2006) to take the required steps or

face further action, including possible sanctions. Further non compliance led to the establishment of the sanctions regime described above.

To date, the pressure exercised by the international community has not succeeded in either confirming the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear program or persuading Iran to halt its further development. It remains to be seen whether the enhanced sanctions regime – coupled with the not-so-veiled threat of an Israeli military action – will convince Iran that it is heading in the wrong direction. Statements made by President Ahmadinejad – who compared the UN scheme to a "used handkerchief that should be thrown in the waste bin" – do not leave much room for optimism.





by Carolina De Simone*

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IRAN STATE-AID REFORM CONTROLLING THE CONSENSUS

Scholars and observers have described the recent economic subsidies reform as one of the most relevant domestic policy changes in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the outcome of a reform campaign which dates back to sixteen years ago, such reduction of state

economic patronage is likely to provide the regime with some sort of protection from external pressure and with additional nonviolent tools to cope with internal opposition, while controlling at the same time vast sectors of the Iranian society the more exposed to the effects of international

economic sanctions. Scarcely reported in international media, subsidies reform has dominated the Iranian political arena in the last months. In the short and medium run this reform might probably generate direct effects on Iran's future domestic politics and foreign policy.

On January 13, 2010, the Guardian Council (a powerful 12-member council in charge inter alia of ensuring the compliance of the legislation passed by the Parliament with Islamic principles and the Constitution) passed a reform plan which basically consisted in a substantial cut in subsidies on prices of nearly all staple commodities - food, energy, water - to be replaced with targeted social assistance in the form of payment transfers. The government-sponsored plan, defined by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as 'the most important economic bill in the past 30 years', was approved after an almost two-year-long fight with Parliament (majlis). Subsidies reductions will be gradually staggered over several years. Cuts were initially intended to phase out in conjunction with the beginning of the fifth five-year development plan in March 2010 but their implementation was then postponed to the second half of 2010 due to the parliamentary obstructionism. Subsidies reductions remained considerable even if members of Parliament managed to remove half of the cuts from the budget bill they approved on March 9.

As many similar petroleum-producing states, post revolutionary Iran has always sustained extensively fuel prices in order to allow the population to benefit from the country's huge oil resources and to mitigate domestic economic and political frustration. Approximately one third of Iran's gross domestic product (GDP) is currently allocated to state aids. According to many sources, the global value of all subsidies programs amount to approximately \$100 billion, with energy subsidies comprising over half of this sum. Such data are remarkable if compared with figures for Iranian trade with major partners in 2007, namely European Union (\$31.86 billion) and China (\$20 billion).

Recognizing the idea that the state could not afford anymore such an extensive social welfare system and calling for a rationalization of state assistance, state aids reform attempts already featured prominently on the agenda of former Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). They were however frustrated by competing political tensions and

the public discontent burst out in some Iranian cities in 2007 when the government tried to promote measures to ration fuel. In recent years international pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund warned Tehran over the urgency of a public expenditure reduction. Ahmadinejad's plan as a matter of fact rely upon some recommendations on a rebate program outlined in 2002 and 2003 in two reports by the World Bank itself.

International economic sanctions (especially U.S. Congress measures) have undoubtedly expedited reform plans, particularly as far as the refined petroleum supply is concerned. Yet the recent Iranian debate demonstrates that the regime also aims at critical domestic goals in supporting reform: gain greater political power, increase the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC, pasdaran) economic role, redistribute income, lessen the budgetary pressure.

At the heart of the plan there is a rebate fund which should alleviate the asperities Iranian lower classes will face as soon as the plan will enter into force. According to media sources (official data are rarely



available) approximately 46.5 million Iranians - roughly 70 percent of population - should benefit from these government money transfers. Such fund might give Ahmadinejad further means to exert political leverage by rewarding government loyalists, while excluding from benefits regime opponents. Should the economic situation exacerbate in the near future, the rebate program could also further boost the regime discontent among business circles and urban élites, let alone middle classes, forming the backbone of the protest movement spread after the disputed re-election of Ahmadinejad in June 2009.

During the months preceding the approval of the bill in January 2010, tensions have raised among ruling élites over the control of the bureaucratic body which should be in charge of the administration of the rebate program. Parliament argued that according to the Constitution, it is its own primary responsibility to oversee the budget, while Ahmadinejad claimed that only the executive power might efficiently and promptly meet the needs generated by unstable economic conditions. The resulting fight between Parliament and President Ahmadinejad over the control of such bureaucratic body has delayed reform's parliamentary procedure, until a compromise was reached just a few days before the final approval. The Parliament will be in charge of supervising the new agency as part of the budgetary process and a number of ministers will be in charge of the cash-granting

body. 50 percent of the funds will be assigned to lower classes, 20 percent will be invested in infrastructures related to the agricultural and industrial sectors, and 20 percent will be managed by Ahmadinejad for activities of his own initiative. Even if formally Ahmadinejad has direct control on only 20 percent of the funds, he might presumably exert a certain degree of indirect influence also on the remaining 80 percent of the rebate funds through his own cabinet ministers who participate in the management of the agency.

State aids reform is likely to significantly damage small and medium size businesses by increasing already high energy-related production costs. At the same time reform will generate an economic environment more favorable to IRGC-connected corporations. Better equipped than others to bear higher production costs because of their larger size, such firms can easily access government capital funding and military procurement and can rely upon income from black market activities extensively controlled by IRGC. Therefore the reform plan would probably further boost an ongoing process leading to some sort of de facto nationalization of the Iranian economy - already essentially controlled by the regime through charitable trusts (bonyads) and pasdaran-owned companies - and enhance even more the IRGC's market dominance.

The reform plan currently covers indistinctly all sectors of Iranian society. As one of the main populist-

inspired reasons in support of reform, Ahmadinejad argues that the plan is intended to redistribute, rather than remove, subsidies in order to increase efficiency. President claims indeed that richest classes unfairly take advantage of the majority of benefits related to subsidies.

Higher production costs might also cause greater inflation in the next years. Ahmadinejad's high deficit spending policy on cash money transfers, housing, infrastructure, and other activities had its impacts. Inflationary effects might harm also lower classes if their salaries and rebate grants do not adjust proportionately.

In addition, an enhanced IRGC economic role and the effects of the rebate program might probably generate distortive effects on Iranian economy more rapidly than international sanctions could. It is early to determine whether the reform will reach its declared goals and relieve part of the strain on the state budget, while some commentators are rather convinced that the reform is very likely to reinforce an increasingly authoritarian and assertive regime and further damage an already weakened opposition movement.

Short and medium term evolutions of Iranian economy will undoubtedly produce direct effects on its future domestic politics and foreign policy. Thus it is essential for the international community to carefully monitor and evaluate key domestic economic indicators when dealing with a more comprehensive strategy towards Iran in the near future.





IEAR

IRAN ELECTORAL ARCHIVE

an overview on iranian electoral process and rules

by Chiara Pagni*

*Internship,
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna*

Nowadays Iran is one of the main actors of the Middle – East geo-politic area. Controversial positions and public declarations made by its leading authorities, with reference both to its internal and external policy, have attracted the attention of the whole international community.

To this regard, the last presidential elections, held the 12 of June 2009,

represented an important democracy test, massively exposed to international media attention and commentaries. After the electoral turn over, widespread protests have been growing into the greatest challenge the Shiite regime ever faced to its authority: thousands of Iranians joined in demonstrations that were finally suppressed with violence and mass arrests.

Despite charges of fraud President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, first elected in 2005, was confirmed at the presidency for his second mandate.

Away from the main political aspects and issues at stake in these circumstances, we find out anyway a worrying scarcity of information dealing with the Iranian electoral process and how it is ruled. The need and the im-

portance to reply to this scarcity has been the main reason why the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, together with external partners, has decided in June 2009 to launch the Iranian Electoral Archive project, hereinafter called the "IEAr".¹

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna through the "International Research Laboratory on Conflict, Development and Global Politics" has been involved in various projects and trainings dealing with election assistance and monitoring, human rights, development and post – conflict rehabilitation, for several years now. Before embarking on the IEAr project, the Scuola designed and managed some other projects, monitoring national and local elections, such as the Baladiyahs Governance Monitoring Project in Algeria and the Technical Assistance Programme for the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.²

1 The IEAr is available at <http://www.iear.sssup.it>

2 The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna has been involved in organizing training courses focused on strengthening electoral observers' personal and professional capacity. On the occasion of the 2004 Presidential Elections held by

All these activities aimed at promoting a better understanding of the political and technical aspects related to the elections in various part of the world. In this contest the Iran Electoral Archive has been thought as

the Interim Government Authority of Afghanistan, the European Commission established a Democracy and Elections Support Mission (DESM) and IOM –as the implementing partner– requested the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna to organize a Pre-Mission Training for all the DESM members. Additionally, the collaboration continued in 2005 when the Scuola trained the EU EOM personnel that observed the 2005 Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections. On October 2007, the European Commission selected a group of 12 Core Team Members and 58 Long-term observers to be part of the EU EOM in Pakistan. The group, that was selected to observe the January 2008 Parliamentary elections, was initially supposed to be deployed in Pakistan the third week of November. In this framework, at the end of September 2007, the EC and the IOM – as implementing partner - contacted the ITPCM of Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna to verify its availability to organize a Pre-mission Training for those professionals selected to be deployed in Pakistan. The Pre-Mission Training Course was scheduled from 5 to 10 November 2007 with the aim of increasing the EU capacity to observe the 2008 elections in Pakistan. The structure of the course was developed by the ITPCM taking into consideration specific requests of the European Commission and IOM.

useful way to better understand the background of Iranian presidential elections. The project was launched in order to create some kinds of synergies for knowledge management and information exchange within the Scuola, outside researchers, academic institutions and even the common people.

Thanks to its multidisciplinary approach, the IEAr aims at providing comprehensive and multi – faceted representation of the phenomena of the electoral process, observed through the lenses of law, history, religion and with the goal of offering such a complete and scientific overview of the process itself. It constitutes therefore a comprehensive source of information, including laws, high quality documents, and academic articles on Iranian Elections.

The key objective of the project is to provide a large variety of stakeholders with a comprehensive and impartial look at the Iranian electoral process. The IEAr pursues its objectives inspired by the principles of impartiality and independence. For these reasons, all the documents included in the Archive have been selected by a



team of highly qualified and independent researchers within and outside the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and have been approved by an independent external body.

It is structured in fourteen interlinked topics. (1) "Iranian Constitution" which provides an introduction to the constitution of the country. (2) and (3), respectively entitled the "Parliament" and the "President", support the legislative and executive branch structures, competences, powers and responsibilities. (4) "Local Officials", dedicated to the analysis of the sub-national government structure, powers, and responsibilities, and how these offices are filled through elections. (5) "Electoral Law and Bylaws" dealing with relevant electoral rules. (6) "Political Parties" identifies the major political parties with their political tendencies and their status in recent elections. (7) "Women in Politics", tries to identify the women role played in Iranian electoral system together with their involvement as candidates, representatives and voting citizens. (8) "Media and Censor-

ship" describes Iranian media landscape, the role they play in reporting on electoral campaigns and the problems connected to public censorship. (9) "Technology" tries to identify the main election technology used in registration, voting, or ballots tabulations and the system of employing such tools. (10) "Dispute Resolution" analyses the election dispute resolution process and provides a notional examination of the type of disputes that emerged in recent election. (11) "Election History" and (13) "Others": the first one deals with general aspects of the history of Iranian elections, while section (13), instead, aims at informing the audience through supplementary documents, including religious influences, candidates, voter registration, voter education, freedom of assembly and movement, freedom from fear and intimidation, funding of campaign and use of public resources, vote counting and compilation of results, etc.

Finally, the last components of the IEAr's structure: a list of "Relevant Websites", section (12), from where the web visitor can access relevant

website focussing on Iranian electoral process, and section (14) "2009 Presidential Election" devoted to this specific issue.

All material uploaded, anyone can find in the IEAr web site, is inspired by the principles of impartiality and independence. To this purpose, as mentioned before, each documents has been selected by a team of high qualified and independent researchers whose interests revolves around Iran and electoral processes.³

The IEAr project addresses various audiences, including experts and researchers, but also the common people, anybody who would like to deepen its interest for the Iranian electoral process.

We hope to have met and to be meeting the interest of many.

³ The researchers involved in IEAr project come from both the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and outside.



about the ITPCM

pp. 21 - 26

WWW.NIFOPE.IT

ITALIAN TRAINING NETWORK FOR PEACEKEEPING & EMERGENCIES



**Scuola Superiore
Sant'Anna**
di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento

NIFOPE stands for "Italian Training Network for Peacekeeping and Emergencies"

It is a national network for an horizontal coordination among centers and institutions involved in the training of personnel for civilian crisis missions

It is conceived as a mechanism to facilitate coordination, avoid duplication of efforts, trigger joint common activities and actions in the field of civilian training

The network is founded on the following key principles:

A common and coordinated approach to training triggers compatible approaches towards the development and management of knowledge and skills that improve the quality of the national contribution to peace support operations and, indirectly, contributes to ameliorate impact of the work that such operations carry out

An harmonized knowledge management approach leads to greater efficacy in the provision of training

for civilian crisis management missions and enables for the sharing of resources, costs and time in training personnel

Uniting for training efforts allows for a better coordinated national contribution to civilian crisis management missions and enables to better strategize on how to use resources in a cost-effective way utilizing ad optimum the existing capacities for the organization and delivery of training

THE WEBSITE

The website is divided into a public and a restricted area

By visiting the public area members of the network and any generic visitor will be informed about activities, events and courses offered by each member

A wide range of documents and online library resources, along with multimedia resources will be available to the interested internet surfer. Specific sections devoted to possible missions, flagging training events, useful links and contacts are also

available

Only members of the network have access to the restricted area

Each member is provided with its personal access keys (log-in & password)

By the means of a series of inserting FORMS members can upload activities, courses, events, documents and other info

Network members have full control over their own uploads (delete, cancel, modify, update...)

All uploaded resources will be visible and accessible from the public area

Only 'reserved documents' will remain accessible only to members

The website has been designed and developed by the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna of Pisa under the auspices of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

www.nifope.it
nifope@sssup.it

open applications fellowships available


MAHRCM IX EDITION - A.Y. 2010-2011, PISA - ITALY

Master of Arts in Human Rights & Conflict Management

MORE INFO:

humanrights@sssup.it
www.humanrights.sssup.it

The Master of Arts in Human Rights and Conflict Management is designed to provide students from different cultures and backgrounds with a deep understanding of the linkages between human rights and conflict management theory and practice. The curriculum, strongly field oriented, prepares participants for working with NGOs, governments, aid agencies, the UN system, regional organisations and other institutions where a deep understanding of these issues is critical.



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MULTIPART PROJECT

OPEN FINAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

PISA, SEPTEMBER 22 - 23, 2010

Can multi-stakeholder partnerships positively impact on human security and thus, facilitate non-violence and long-term peace, providing a productive framework for relations between local actors and external actors, including third party mediators and international organizations? How and under what conditions?

MultiPart Project, supported by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Union for research, technological development and demonstration activities, socio-economic and humanities research, has carried out a thirty-month investigation involving eleven

European research institutions, in order to explore opportunities to directly impact on partnerships that are evolving in conflict-affected societies and to reflect on the role played by partnerships' stakeholders, including international actors.

This two-day event will provide the occasion to present and evaluate the strategic findings of the research project and stimulate dialogue among scholars and stakeholders actively engaged in the issue of post-conflict development, and promote informed exchange on the nature and role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in conflict-affected countries.

On the first day renowned experts

from academia and International Organizations will address crucial issues in the current debate over MSPs in conflict-affected countries, providing a combination of theoretical and technical expertise as well as political insights.

On the second day the debate will be organised in two panels around the strategic findings of the Project and will engage selected Multi-stakeholder Partnerships' representatives from private, public and civic sectors, donors' representatives and local researchers from the study countries of the Project - Kosovo, DRC and Afghanistan.

Your participation is highly welcome!

For more information contact the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies - MultiPart Project Coordinator – at pm.multipart@sssup.it or +39 050 883716.

visit the project website: www.multi-part.eu



WINTER SCHOOL

PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS IN EMERGENCY DISPLACEMENT

PISA, FEBRUARY 14 - 26 2011

organised by the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

Psychosocial activities have become an indispensable component of humanitarian responses to emergency displacement. However, a non-harmonized approach to and understanding of psychosocial response usually characterizes those interventions. The Winter School aims at presenting harmonized ethics, approaches and tools within a given frame of understanding of the psychosocial dimension of displacement. The course will give an overview of both specific psychosocial programming and psychosocial approaches to different dimensions of humanitarian assistance in emergency displacement.

APPLICATION DEADLINE: 15 NOVEMBER 2010 **MORE INFO: www.itpcm.sssup.it, a.lenci@sssup.it**



TEACHING LANGUAGE: ITALIAN

COMUNICARE LA COOPERAZIONE E LA SOLIDARIETÀ INTERNAZIONALE

STRUMENTI OPERATIVI E BUONE PRATICHE

ulteriori informazioni: www.itpcm.sssup.it**PROGRAMMA DEL CORSO**

Coniugando aspetti teorici e pratici il Corso si propone di:

I trimestre 2011

analizzare l'importanza ed il ruolo della comunicazione nelle attività di cooperazione internazionale

offrire una panoramica sui principali mezzi di comunicazione e sul loro utilizzo

presentare le metodologie di comunicazione utili per raggiungere target specifici

analizzare gli elementi e le modalità di costruzione di una campagna di sensibilizzazione

presentare buone pratiche e casi studio nel settore della comunicazione in ambito internazionale

PROFILO DEI PARTECIPANTI

Il Corso si rivolge a coloro che, a titolo personale o per esigenze professionali, sono impegnati nel settore della cooperazione e solidarietà internazionale e che sono interessati ad incrementare la loro capacità di comunicare le attività promosse e i risultati raggiunti nel settore. Il numero massimo di partecipanti è stabilito in 25.

CONTATTI

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IN BREVE

Data di svolgimento

da definire

Ore di Formazione

32

Numero massimo di partecipanti

25

Quota d'iscrizione

400,00 euro

apertura iscrizioni

da definire



EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION TRAINING PROGRAMME

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was established by the European Commission at the end of 2001. It aims to facilitate, on request, the civil protection response to all types of emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters and environmental accidents occurring inside and outside the Community. By pooling the civil protection capabilities of the participating states, the Community Mechanism can ensure even better protection primarily of people, but also of the natural and cultural environment as well as property.

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in partnership with the Italian Civil Protection Department and the Italian Firefighters, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department is

In order to enhance coordination of civil protection assistance interventions the Commission set up a training programme for intervention teams and for the experts responsible for assessment and/or coordination. The training programme aims at improving personal response competencies and at ensuring complementarity and compatibility between intervention teams coming from different participating states.

responsible for the design, planning, conduction and evaluation of 8 Community Civil Protection Mechanism courses (7th cycle).

next courses in agenda (not open for applications)

Community Mechanism Induction Course

Location: Istituto Superiore Antincendi - Roma

Dates: 5-11 October 2010

Community Mechanism Induction Course

(8CMI 10)

Location: Istituto Superiore Antincendi (ISA) - Roma

Dates: 15 - 21 January 2011

High Level Coordination Course (8HLC2)

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna - Pisa

Dates: 14 -18 February 2011

Media and Security Strategy Course

(8MSC3)

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna - Pisa

Dates: 2 - 8 April 2011

Contact Person:

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