



Evidence for sharp increase in the economic damages of extreme natural disasters

Matteo Coronese^a, Francesco Lamperti^{a,b}, Klaus Keller^c, Francesca Chiaromonte^{a,d,1}, and Andrea Roventini^{a,e,1}

^aInstitute of Economics and EMbeDS—Economics and Management in the Era of Data Science, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa, 56127 Pisa, Italy; ^bRFF-CMCC European Institute of Economics and the Environment, 20144 Milan, Italy; ^cDepartment of Geosciences, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802; ^dDepartment of Statistics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802; and ^eObservatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques, SciencesPo, BP 85 06902, Sophia Antipolis, France

Edited by Arild Underdal, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, and approved September 5, 2019 (received for review May 8, 2019)

Climate change has increased the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. Does this translate into increased economic damages? To date, empirical assessments of damage trends have been inconclusive. Our study demonstrates a temporal increase in extreme damages, after controlling for a number of factors. We analyze event-level data using quantile regressions to capture patterns in the damage distribution (not just its mean) and find strong evidence of progressive rightward skewing and tail-fattening over time. While the effect of time on averages is hard to detect, effects on extreme damages are large, statistically significant, and growing with increasing percentiles. Our results are consistent with an upwardly curved, convex damage function, which is commonly assumed in climate-economics models. They are also robust to different specifications of control variables and time range considered and indicate that the risk of extreme damages has increased more in temperate areas than in tropical ones. We use simulations to show that underreporting bias in the data does not weaken our inferences; in fact, it may make them overly conservative.

climate change | natural disasters | economic damages | tail effects

Climate change has been convincingly linked to an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters in many regions (1–4). However, whether and how this is reflected in increasing economic impacts remains unclear. Long-term upward trends in damages, when detected, have been interpreted as indicative of increasing future risks and of a need for prevention and adaptation efforts (5–7). They have also been seen as indirect evidence for climate change (8, 9). But there are still substantial disagreements on whether such trends exist. Some studies report statistically significant long-term increases in damages, but only for selected hazards (10, 11). Other studies report an increasing global trend (12, 13), though researchers have questioned the robustness of this finding with respect to methodological choices (14). These inconsistencies have led many to reject the notion that damages caused by natural disasters are growing over time (10, 15–17). Part of the debate to date has focused on how to properly normalize damage values to eliminate confounding factors (e.g., inflation, population, and wealth per capita) and ensure comparability of measurements across time and space. Recent Actual-to-Potential-Loss normalization approaches (17) did overcome problems associated with earlier techniques, which typically accounted for rates of change in confounding factors, but not for their absolute sizes. Nevertheless, these approaches did not reveal statistically significant trends in damages (17).

Inconclusive results in the literature might be due to the use of statistical techniques ill-suited to capture the evolution of the damage distribution. We hypothesize that relevant patterns may in fact correspond to changes in its right skew and tail. To investigate this, we use a different modeling and statistical strategy. First, we include control variables for socio-demographic factors as covariates in our models alongside time—this generalizes the Actual-to-Potential-Loss approach, allowing for multiple controls, and improves upon procedures that normalize damage

values prior to modeling (*Normalization*). Second, and perhaps most importantly, we characterize the behavior of the damage distribution fitting quantile regressions over disaggregated, event-level data.

Our approach avoids 2 common pitfalls: 1) linear aggregation—i.e., summing damages associated to disasters occurring in a given year over a specified geographical area, which may lead to a substantial loss of information—and 2) the use of ordinary least squares (OLS)—i.e., mean regression, which captures only average trends in damages (changes in expected losses) (17, 18). With increasing evidence that natural disasters induce fat-tailed damage distributions (19) and that fat tails can dramatically change policy implications in a variety of climate-economics models (20), analyzing quantiles can be an effective way to inspect extreme, low-probability events. In addition, OLS regression can be a rather blunt instrument to analyze skewed data. In contrast, quantile regressions do not rely on Gaussianity or even symmetry assumptions for the error distribution and have already been used to characterize the evolution of cyclone strength (21–23).

The Devil Is in the Tails: From Climate Stressors to Damages

We hypothesize that what changes over time is the right skew and tail behavior (as opposed to the average) of the damage distribution. This can be explained using the concept of *damage function*. Damage functions are widely used in the Integrated Assessment Modeling literature to link climate-related stressors (e.g., wind speed for tropical cyclones or storm surges) to damages. Characterizing such functions poses conceptual and econometric challenges (24–27) which are specific to the economic sectors, spatio-temporal scales, and feedbacks (e.g., adaptation) under

Significance

Observations indicate that climate change has driven an increase in the intensity of natural disasters. This, in turn, may drive an increase in economic damages. Whether these trends are real is an open and highly policy-relevant question. Based on decades of data, we provide robust evidence of mounting economic impacts, mostly driven by changes in the right tail of the damage distribution—that is, by major disasters. This points to a growing need for climate risk management.

Author contributions: M.C., F.L., K.K., F.C., and A.R. designed research; M.C. and F.L. performed research; M.C. analyzed data; and M.C., F.L., K.K., F.C., and A.R. wrote the paper.

The authors declare no competing interest.

This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.

This open access article is distributed under [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 \(CC BY-NC-ND\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Data deposition: Code for our analyses has been deposited in GitHub, <https://github.com/mcoronese/extreme-disasters>.

¹To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: fxc11@psu.edu or andrea.roventini@santannapisa.it.

This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1907826116/-DCSupplemental.




Fig. 2. Empirical distributions of economic damages from natural disasters (A) and estimated time trends from Model 2 (B). (A) Yearly distributions of economic damages (US\$ billion) associated with $n = 10,901$ disasters occurred worldwide between 1960 and 2015 (see data description in *Data and Code*). We show partial boxplots colored by decade. Lower and upper hinges correspond to medians and 90th percentiles, respectively; middle lines to 75th percentiles; and upper whiskers to 99th percentiles; the top 1% single-event damages amounted to US\$482 million in 1970 and to US\$9.92 billion in 2010—an ~20-fold increase. The red dashed line tracks the time progression of the 99th percentiles (kernel smooth), illustrating the marked increase in damages due to extreme events. *A, Inset* zooms into the right tails of the distributions and shows their progressive fattening over time [Gaussian kernel density estimates on log-transformed damages aggregated by decade, bandwidth fixed with Silverman’s rule (42)]. (B) Quantile and OLS (mean) regressions for the same data (but in US\$ million and restricted to $n = 9,495$ disasters occurred between 1960 and 2014 after preprocessing; *Data and Code*). The model used is 2. The horizontal axis represents percentiles and the vertical one estimated time trends; e.g., at the 99th percentile, we estimate the top 1% single-event damages to increase by US\$26.4 million every year. The time trend estimate from OLS (statistically nonsignificant at 5% level) is shown as a constant, with its standard 95% CI. Quantile regressions estimates are obtained through the modified Barrodale–Roberts algorithm (38) and a 95% confidence band around them is produced with $r = 1,000$ bootstrap samples [joint resampling of response and predictor pairs (40)]. Full results on estimates and standard errors are given in *SI Appendix, Table S2*.

time, but not by time per se (the interaction is then interpreted as the time trend for damages over GDP; *Normalization*). Table 1 reports the estimates for Model 1 obtained through OLS (mean) and quantile fits with time, GDP, and their interaction, but no additional covariates.

The pure time trend is not statistically significant for the OLS, but it is positive, statistically significant, and approximately exponentially increasing along percentiles for quantile regressions (e.g., $P < 1\%$ at the 95th percentile; see Table 1 for other P values). The interaction term is not statistically significant for large percentiles ($P > 10\%$), suggesting that the increasing pattern we document for extreme damages is not due to increases in wealth at risk. Also, while fit quality is poor for the bulk of the distribution (OLS and percentiles up to 80%), it increases considerably for the upper percentiles.

Given its small effect size and limited statistical significance, we remove the interaction term and use the more parsimonious Model 2 (*Regression Models*) comprising only time and GDP. As can be seen in Fig. 2B, estimation results are entirely consistent with those of Model 1. In a format analogous to that of Figs. 1B and 2B shows time trend estimates obtained through OLS and quantile regressions for percentiles $\geq 80\%$. Remarkably, observations from 55 years of disasters around the world reveal patterns that are qualitatively similar to those from our synthetic experiment with a shifting GEV stressor and a prototypical damage function: The change in the mean is small (and statistically nonsignificant at 5% level), while upper percentiles have strong, positive, and statistically significant time trends (e.g., $P < 1\%$ at the 95th percentile; see *SI Appendix, Table S2* for other P values), whose magnitude increases exponentially with the percentiles. Such results indicate that the economic impacts of natural disasters are indeed growing, but not at all scales. The hallmark is a sharp increase in the risk of extreme damages, which induces a weak and hard-to-detect signal in the mean loss. This highlights the importance of considering the distribution of

economic damages, not just its mean, and suggests—at a global scale—poor adaptation capacity to extreme events.

Our findings are robust to a wide range of model specifications. Modifying the control component in Model 2 (e.g., adding population or using GDP per capita instead of GDP) produces similar patterns (*SI Appendix, Tables S3 and S4*), as does modifying the time span (e.g., fitting our regressions on data from 1960, 1970, or 1980; *SI Appendix, Tables S2 and S3*).

Next, we refine the analysis considering climate zones. Specifically, after geo-localizing all events in our sample, we estimate Model 3 (*Regression Models*), which comprises categorical control covariates for the Köppen–Geiger climate zones where disasters occurred (see *Data and Code* for details; *SI Appendix, Table S1* documents a mild association between climate zones and income). For cold and arid zones, the time trends estimated from quantile regressions are small and statistically nonsignificant across most percentiles, possibly due to smaller sample sizes (*SI Appendix, Table S1*). However, in line with our results at a global scale, Fig. 3 shows upper percentiles of the damage distributions growing considerably and significantly in temperate and tropical zones (e.g., P value at the 95th percentile $< 1\%$ for the former and $< 10\%$ for the latter; see *SI Appendix, Table S5* for other P values). Interestingly, the pattern is stronger for temperate than tropical zones, where disasters are instead more frequent*; even the OLS detects a statistically significant time trend in temperate zones, while it still fails to do so in tropical ones (*SI Appendix, Table S5*). The stronger patterns may be due to the rising number of extreme weather events occurring in temperate zones (3), as well as to effective adaptation in tropical ones.†

* L. Bakkensen, L. Barrage, Climate shocks, cyclones, and economic growth: Bridging the micro-macro gap (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018). No. w24893.

† L. Bakkensen, L. Barrage, Climate shocks, cyclones, and economic growth: Bridging the micro-macro gap (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018). No. w24893.




Fig. 3. Quantile regressions for damages (US\$ million) associated with $n = 9,495$ disasters occurred between 1960 and 2014 in different Köppen–Geiger climate zones (excluding the polar class). The model used is 3. The horizontal axis represents percentiles and the vertical one estimated time trends: e.g., at the 99th percentile, we estimate the top 1% single event damages to increase by US\$17.9 million every year in tropical areas and by US\$46.5 million in temperate ones. Quantile regressions estimates are obtained through the modified Barrodale–Roberts algorithm (38) and a 95% confidence band around them is produced with $r = 1,000$ bootstrap samples [joint resampling of response and predictor pairs (40)]. Time trend estimates for cold and arid zones are shown with dashed lines and without confidence bands because they were statistically nonsignificant for most percentiles. Full results on estimates and standard errors are given in *SI Appendix, Table S5*.

Notably, the explanatory power of the quantile regressions used in both Figs. 2B and 3 increases along percentiles (*SI Appendix, Fig. S2*), confirming that most of the loss dynamics occurs in the right tail of the damage distributions.

Beyond Economic Impacts: Lives Lost

Human losses (casualties) are another important impact of natural disasters. When binned across years, they are also right skewed, but less so than economic damages, and instead of fat tails, they present extremely large isolated outliers—for example, a 1965 drought in India caused a famine that led to the death of 1.5 million people (39). Moreover, in contrast to damages, casualties display a discernible downward trend over time (Fig. 4A). We investigate this behavior using Model 4, which comprises time, population (as the key control covariate), and their interaction. As shown in Fig. 4B, the trend is negative and statistically significant for the upper percentiles (e.g., $P < 1\%$ at the 95th percentile; see *SI Appendix, Table S6* for other P values), with the size of the estimate increasing monotonically. Results do not qualitatively change when controlling also for GDP or varying the time span (*SI Appendix, Tables S6 and S7*).

While this global evidence for decreasing casualties over time is good news, interesting patterns emerge when breaking down the analysis by hazard type and country income class. For instance, the strongest fall in the 99th percentile of yearly casualties per inhabitant is observed for droughts (*SI Appendix, Fig. S3*), suggesting an increased ability to cope with this natural hazard. Despite slightly higher frequencies and strength (43), in recent decades, extreme droughts have become less fatal (39). So have extreme floods, but only in rich countries. We observed an increasing polarization between poor and rich areas of the world also for casualties caused by storms. Finally, and concerning, extreme temperature events have become more deadly in poor and rich countries alike (*SI Appendix, Fig. S3*).

Biases in Data May Hide Even Larger Economic Impacts

Our assessment of the trends in economic damages may be overly conservative due to a number of issues affecting disaster data.




Fig. 4. Empirical distribution of deaths from natural disasters (A) and estimated time trend from Model 4 (B). (A) Yearly distributions of deaths associated with $n = 10,901$ disasters occurred worldwide between 1960 and 2015. We show boxplots colored by decade. Lower and upper hinges correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively; middle lines to medians and upper whiskers to 90th percentiles; the top 10% single-event deaths amounted to 585 in 1970 and to 114 in 2010—an ~ 5 -fold decrease (the top 1% single-event deaths decreased by more than 80-fold from 156,744 to 18,51; not shown in the graph). The red dashed line tracks the time progression of the 90th percentile (kernel smooth), illustrating the marked decrease in deaths due to extreme events. A, *Inset* zooms into the right tails of the distributions and shows their progressive thinning [Gaussian kernel density estimates on log-transformed deaths aggregated by decade, bandwidth fixed with Silverman’s rule (42)]. (B) Quantile and OLS mean regressions for the same data (but restricted to $n = 9,495$ disasters between 1960 and 2014 after preprocessing; *Data and Code*). The model used is 4. The horizontal axis represents percentiles and the vertical one estimated time trends; e.g., at the 99th percentile, we estimate the top 1% single-event deaths to decrease by 52.1 every year. The time trend estimate from OLS (statistically nonsignificant) is shown as a constant, with its standard 95% CI. Quantile regression estimates are obtained through the modified Barrodale–Roberts algorithm (38), and the 95% confidence band around them is produced with $r = 1,000$ bootstrap samples [joint resampling of response and predictor pairs (40)]. Full results on estimates and standard errors are given in *SI Appendix, Table S6*.

In the baseline version of this model, we used only population as control, again with no other covariates. Categorical covariates were introduced in the same way as for damage models. For each model, in addition to a standard OLS (mean) regression, we fit quantile regressions for percentiles from the 70th to the 99th. Note that covariate sets and spatial resolutions different from the ones we employed can be easily accommodated in these models and fits. Robustness checks with additional covariates are included in [SI Appendix](#).

Normalization. Our models have easy-to-interpret parameters, do not require aggregation over events, and allow us to introduce any type of controls (e.g., the potential effect of population dynamics on total destroyable wealth, as in refs. 52 and 53). We thus overcame the need for (premodeling) normalization and generalized the Actual-to-Potential-Loss approach (17), which normalizes monetary damages by dividing every observation by the GDP of the area affected by the disaster. This produces a nondimensional measure of wealth destroyed as a fraction of the maximum potentially destroyable wealth. Based on the normalized damages Da_i^* , the effect of time is then evaluated with a model of the kind

$$Da_i^* \equiv \frac{Da_i}{GDP_{c(\ell_i),t_i}} = a + bt_i, \quad [5]$$

which is a special case of Model 1, since it can be rewritten as

$$Da_i = \gamma GDP_{c(\ell_i),t_i} + \delta t_i \times GDP_{c(\ell_i),t_i}. \quad [6]$$

Model 6 has no intercept and no pure time effect, only wealth and its interaction with time. The more general Model 1 allows us to test whether wealth and time interact in affecting damages and provides both estimates and inference for the pure time term.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Federico Tamagni, Irene Monasterolo, James Rising, Giulio Bottazzi, Matteo Sostero, Daniele Giachini, and the participants in several conferences and workshops for their useful comments. This work was supported by the European Union Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under Grant 822781 (GROWINPRO) and partially by the Penn State Center for Climate Risk Management.

1. M. K. Van Aalst, The impacts of climate change on the risk of natural disasters. *Disasters* **30**, 5–18 (2006).
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2007).
3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Managing The Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2012).
4. F. E. L. Otto et al., Attributing high-impact extreme events across timescales—a case study of four different types of events. *Clim. Change* **149**, 399–412 (2018).
5. F. Thomalla, T. Downing, E. Spanger-Siegrfried, G. Han, J. Rockström, Reducing hazard vulnerability: Towards a common approach between disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation. *Disasters* **30**, 39–48 (2006).
6. L. Schipper, M. Pelling, Disaster risk, climate change and international development: Scope for, and challenges to, integration. *Disasters* **30**, 19–38 (2006).
7. S. Hallegatte, “Disaster risks: Evidence and theory” in *Natural Disasters and Climate Change* (Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2014), pp. 51–76.
8. L. M. Bouwer, Have disaster losses increased due to anthropogenic climate change? *Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc.* **92**, 39–46 (2011).
9. M. Helmer, D. Hilhorst, Natural disasters and climate change. *Disasters* **30**, 1–4 (2006).
10. S. Schmidt, C. Kemfert, P. Höppe, Tropical cyclone losses in the USA and the impact of climate change—a trend analysis based on data from a new approach to adjusting storm losses. *Environ. Impact Assess. Rev.* **29**, 359–369 (2009).
11. M. Gall, K. A. Borden, C. T. Emrich, S. L. Cutter, The unsustainable trend of natural hazard losses in the United States. *Sustainability* **3**, 2157–2181 (2011).
12. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Impacts, adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2001).
13. N. H. Stern, *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2007).
14. R. Pielke, Mistreatment of the economic impacts of extreme events in the Stern review report on the economics of climate change. *Glob. Environ. Chang.* **17**, 302–310 (2007).
15. R. A. Pielke Jr, C. W. Landsea, Normalized hurricane damages in the United States: 1925–95. *Weather Forecast.* **13**, 621–631 (1998).
16. R. A. Pielke Jr et al., Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900–2005. *Nat. Hazards Rev.* **9**, 29–42 (2008).
17. E. Neumayer, F. Barthel, Normalizing economic loss from natural disasters: A global analysis. *Glob. Environ. Chang.* **21**, 13–24 (2011).
18. J. I. Barredo, Normalised flood losses in Europe: 1970–2006. *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci.* **9**, 97–104 (2009).
19. R. Mendelsohn, K. Emanuel, S. Chonabayashi, L. Bakkensen, The impact of climate change on global tropical cyclone damage. *Nat. Clim. Chang.* **2**, 205–209 (2012).
20. R. S. Pindyck, Fat tails, thin tails, and climate change policy. *Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy* **5**, 258–274 (2011).
21. J. B. Elsner, J. P. Kossin, T. H. Jagger, The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones. *Nature* **455**, 92–95 (2008).
22. J. P. Kossin, T. L. Olander, K. R. Knapp, Trend analysis with a new global record of tropical cyclone intensity. *J. Clim.* **26**, 9960–9976 (2013).
23. B. J. Reich, Spatiotemporal quantile regression for detecting distributional changes in environmental processes. *J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. C* **61**, 535–553 (2012).
24. B. F. Prahl, D. Rybski, M. Boettle, J. P. Kropp, Damage functions for climate-related hazards: Unification and uncertainty analysis. *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci.* **16**, 1189–1203 (2016).
25. V. Meyer et al., Assessing the costs of natural hazards-state of the art and knowledge gaps. *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci.* **13**, 1351–1373 (2013).
26. S. Hallegatte et al., Assessing climate change impacts, sea level rise and storm surge risk in port cities: A case study on Copenhagen. *Clim. Change* **104**, 113–137 (2011).
27. M. Burke, S. M. Hsiang, E. Miguel, Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production. *Nature* **527**, 235–239 (2015).
28. W. D. Nordhaus, An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. *Science* **258**, 1315–1319 (1992).
29. S. Hsiang et al., Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United States. *Science* **356**, 1362–1369 (2017).
30. B. F. Prahl, M. Boettle, L. Costa, J. P. Kropp, D. Rybski, Damage and protection cost curves for coastal floods within the 600 largest European cities. *Sci. Data* **5**, 180034 (2018).
31. M. R. Leadbetter, Extremes and local dependence in stationary sequences. *Probab. Theory Relat. Fields* **65**, 291–306 (1983).
32. J. R. M. Hosking, J. R. Wallis, *Regional Frequency Analysis: An Approach Based on L-Moments* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2005).
33. J. E. Morrison, J. A. Smith, Stochastic modeling of flood peaks using the generalized extreme value distribution. *Water Resour. Res.* **38**, 41–1–41–12 (2002).
34. B. S. Lee, M. Haran, K. Keller, Multidecadal scale detection time for potentially increasing Atlantic storm surges in a warming climate. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **44**, 10–617 (2017).
35. T. H. Jagger, J. B. Elsner, Climatology models for extreme hurricane winds near the United States. *J. Clim.* **19**, 3220–3236 (2006).
36. S. Coles, E. Casson, Extreme value modelling of hurricane wind speeds. *Struct. Saf.* **20**, 283–296 (1998).
37. M. R. Tye, D. B. Stephenson, G. J. Holland, R. W. Katz, A Weibull approach for improving climate model projections of tropical cyclone wind-speed distributions. *J. Clim.* **27**, 6119–6133 (2014).
38. R. W. Koenker, V. d’Orey, Algorithm as 229: Computing regression quantiles. *J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. C* **36**, 383–393 (1987).
39. D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, P. Hoyois, *Em-Dat: International Disaster Database* (Catholic University of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium, 2015).
40. B. Efron, R. J. Tibshirani, *An Introduction to the Bootstrap* (CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1994).
41. R. Koenker, J. A. F. Machado, Goodness of fit and related inference processes for quantile regression. *J. Am. Stat. Assoc.* **94**, 1296–1310 (1999).
42. B. W. Silverman, *Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis* (CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1986), v26.
43. J. Spinoni, G. Naumann, H. Carrao, P. Barbosa, J. Vogt, World drought frequency, duration, and severity for 1951–2010. *Int. J. Climatol.* **34**, 2792–2804 (2014).
44. D. Guha-Sapir, O. D’Aoust, F. Vos, P. Hoyois, “The frequency and impact of natural disasters” in *The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters*, D. Guha-Sapir, I. Santos, Eds. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013), pp. 7–27.
45. W. Kron, M. Steuer, P. Löw, A. Wirtz, How to deal properly with a natural catastrophe database—analysis of flood losses. *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci.* **12**, 535–550 (2012).
46. D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, “The quality and accuracy of disaster data.” (Working paper, Disaster Management Facility, World Bank, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels, Belgium, 2002).
47. A. Wirtz, W. Kron, P. Löw, M. Steuer, The need for data: Natural disasters and the challenges of database management. *Nat. Hazards* **70**, 135–157 (2014).
48. F. Lamperti, G. Dosi, M. Napoletano, A. Roventini, A. Sapio, Faraway, so close: Coupled climate and economic dynamics in an agent-based integrated assessment model. *Ecol. Econ.* **150**, 315–339 (2018).
49. M. Kottek, J. Grieser, C. Beck, B. Rudolf, F. Rubel, World map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification updated. *Meteorol. Z.* **15**, 259–263 (2006).
50. M. C. Peel, B. L. Finlayson, T. A. McMahon, Updated world map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification. *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss.* **4**, 439–473 (2007).
51. R. C. Feenstra, R. Inklaar, M. P. Timmer, The next generation of the Penn world table. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **105**, 3150–3182 (2015).
52. I. Noy, The macroeconomic consequences of disasters. *J. Dev. Econ.* **88**, 221–231 (2009).
53. D. K. Kellenberg, A. M. Mobarak, Does rising income increase or decrease damage risk from natural disasters? *J. Urban Econ.* **63**, 788–802 (2008).