This paper analyses two draft constitutional amendments that have recently been submitted. Both aim to deal with a long-standing complaint: parliamentary majorities routinely tend to modify the electoral laws for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate ahead of the next general election in order to avoid or minimise an electoral defeat. This contributes to the chronical instability of national electoral laws in Italy, which has significant effects on the public perception of the "rules of the game". Both draft constitutional amendments provide for stronger requirements for the adoption of electoral laws for the Chamber and the Senate. The plurality rule would be replaced by a majority or two-thirds majority requirement. In spite of their common goal, the two proposals differ considerably. Due to the inherent complexity of electoral laws, the impact of this proposals on the overall constitutional system needs careful consideration.
|Titolo:||Stabilità e condivisione delle scelte in materia elettorale. Osservazioni sulle proposte di legge costituzionale A.C. 2244 e 2335|
DELLEDONNE, GIACOMO (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo su Rivista/Article|